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INTRODUCTION: 
 
At the time of writing, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has been in office for some 15 
months – sweeping into power on a wave of high popularity, only to be followed 
subsequently by voter disillusionment and heavy loss of public support. The promised 
reforms, which so captured the public imagination in August 2009, have stalled or faded, 
leaving the DPJ questioning its reason for being and its capacity to lead Japan forward from 
the debilitating effects of the “lost decade” of the 1990s and the ineffectiveness of its long-
ruling predecessors, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).  
Its 15-month period of dominion could perhaps best be summed up as a time of initial high 
hopes, followed by increasingly thwarted ambitions. The high hopes began in August 2009, 
with a landslide win in the Lower House Election, embodied by the DPJ’s capturing a 
staggering 196 extra seats, giving the untried and idealistic new party 308 seats in the 480 
seat House. The DPJ campaign had been based on a positive reformist agenda and an image 
of youthful vitality. It had put forward two main slogans – “regime change” (seiken kotai) 
and “quality of life first” (seikatsu dai-ichi). Regime change was to consist of the subjugation 
of the bureaucracy, the ruling party itself and the Diet to the Cabinet. Quality of life was to be 
initiated through increased child allowances, free tuition at public high schools, income 
support for agriculture, pension and health care reforms, raising the minimum wage and 
cutting wasteful spending. It appeared that the new government was implementing, in the 
words of Tobias Harris, “a genuine revolution in how the country is governed ... [based on] 
far-reaching reforms in domestic and foreign policy.” 
 It did not take long, though, for matters to unravel. The DPJ’s ambitions were, piece by 
piece, thwarted, embodied by the collapse in June 2010 of the Yukio Hatoyama government, 
with the resignations of both the Prime Minister and the Party Secretary-General, Ichiro 
Ozawa, after only nine months in office, over money scandals and the failure to implement 
election promises to remove United States military forces from Okinawa. The process of 
unravelling continued under the new Prime Minister, Naoto Kan, who, in July 2010, lost the 
Upper House Election to a resurgent LDP, producing what commentators described as a 
“twisted Diet”, whereby the Kan government does not have enough power in either Chamber 
of Parliament to have its laws passed. Two months later, in September 2010, a blazing 
diplomatic row exploded between Beijing and Tokyo over the detention of a Chinese fishing 
trawler captain, Zhan Qixiong, for allegedly ramming Japanese patrol vessels near the long-
disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – eventually resulting in the humiliating release of the 
detained man following enormous pressure on the Kan government from China, including the 
interrupted supply of vital “rare earth metals”, needed for the production of such high-
technology products as solar panels, guided missiles, i-phones and hybrid cars.  
The Kan government was made to look weak and feeble in the face of concerted Chinese 
demands – giving the impression that Japan will insipidly capitulate under sustained pressure 
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and that its laws can be flouted by any major power, given sufficient intransigence and 
obduracy against Japanese jurisdiction. Thus, having won authority so convincingly in 
August 2009, by late 2010, the DPJ appears to have lost momentum, direction, force and 
credibility – leaving a much-weakened Kan government floundering in voter rejection and 
international mortification at the hands of a rising hegemon, China, and over friction with an 
existing hegemon, the United States.  
The immediate prospects for Japan under the DPJ are uncertain – with domestic policy being 
ravaged by persistent deflation in the economy as well as by rampant public debt of 200% of 
GDP and with foreign policy being rendered ineffectual through still-simmering tension with 
China over disputed territories in the East China Sea, through unresolved strain with the 
United States over its Marines’ Base on Okinawa and through widespread fear of menacing 
airstrikes from North Korea. Japan, therefore, is worried, disillusioned, angry and 
apprehensive. Its new government, which promised so much, has thus far delivered 
comparatively little, leaving Japanese citizens deeply in doubt over their government’s 
capacity and probity and profoundly disturbed over their country’s direction and 
expectations. 
THE DPJ AND JAPAN: 
By any standard of measurement, the victory of the DPJ in the August 2009 Lower House 
Election was extensive and overpowering. Before the Election, the DPJ held 110 seats, whilst 
its main opponent, the LDP held 303 seats. After the Election, the DPJ held 308 seats by 
winning 29.784 million popular votes; whilst the LDP held 119 seats, winning just 18.782 
million popular votes. The differences, therefore, were pronounced and stark. The DPJ held 
189 more seats in the Chamber than did the LDP and had outpolled its conservative rival by 
11.002 million or 58.58% more votes. In terms of respective Coalition strengths, the DPJ, the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP), the New People’s Party (NPP), the New Party Nippon, and 
the New Party Daiichi possessed 320 seats or 66.66% of the Chamber; whereas the LDP and 
the New Komeito Party possessed 140 seats or 29.17% of the Chamber. The “55 System” of 
LDP dominance, that had lasted for almost 54 years of uninterrupted power, had been swept 
comprehensively away and a new political force had emerged, entrusted with shaping a new 
agenda and a new future for Japan and its people.1 
One seasoned observer of Japanese political and electoral behaviour acidly ascribed the 
reason for the dramatic reversal of electoral fortunes between the LDP and the DPJ in August 
2009 as being the culmination of a series of unresolved tensions within the LDP between the 
party’s advocates of “pork” (huge public works spending in electorally-favoured districts) 
and those of “productivity” (better targeted sums of public money spent on projects aimed at 
generating enhanced labour or capital productivity or at a strong multiplier effect throughout 
the entire economy.) The division was over how to attract voter support and how to revitalize 
an economy that had been stagnant for 15 years following the bursting of the asset-bubble in 
1990-91. Such internal discord was to cost the party government in 2009. At the same time, 
                                                            
1 David Arase, “Japan In 2009 A Historic Election Year”, ASIAN SURVEY, 50, 1, (2010): 46. 
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however, the DPJ campaigned astutely, appealing to many voters disenchanted with 
Koizumi-style reforms, market fundamentalism and “reform fatigue” and cleverly 
introducing attractive slogans such as “lifestyle politics” (seikatsu seiji) and “from concrete to 
people” (konkuriito kara hito e). The LDP’s massive collapse, however, was derived in large 
part from self-destructive internal divisions over “pork” and “productivity” segments, 
robbing the party of coherence, strength, credibility and mass appeal.2 
Focus in late 2010, though, has been more on the growing troubles of the Kan government 
than with introspective analysis of the reasons for the DPJ-led Coalition’s leap into public 
office a little more than a year earlier. Much attention is being paid to the damaging and 
ongoing brawl between Japan and China over the Zhan incident of September 2010 and the 
related altercation over the disputed island territories in the East China Sea - ructions that are 
sharply impacting upon mutual public perceptions of each other in terms of bad feelings and 
threat perceptions. In early November 2010, in a joint public opinion survey, The Yomiuri 
Shimbun and Oriental Outlook Weekly, a magazine published by China’s official Xinhua 
News Agency, indicated that a record 87% of Japanese respondents believe China to be 
untrustworthy and that 79% of Chinese respondents hold the same view of Japan. Some 90% 
of Japanese respondents and 81% of Chinese respondents describe Sino-Japanese relations as 
being bad. Moreover, the November 2010 poll report indicated that 81% of Japanese believe 
Japan’s most dangerous military threat to be North Korea, closely followed by China, ranked 
as the second most dangerous threat.3 
Tremorous diplomacy between Japan, China and also Russia has sharply undermined the 
standing of the Kan government. Again, in early November 2010, two major Japanese 
opinion polls showed severe falls in public support for the Prime Minister’s government – 
owing to disappointment over his handling of foreign relations (particularly the territorial 
dispute with China and ineffective responses to a high profile visit made by Russian President 
Dmitry Medvedev to the contested Northern Territories/Kurile Islands) and owing to the 
embarrassing leak to You Tube of a confidential video depicting the collision between a 
Chinese trawler and Japanese Coast Guard vessels. A Yomiuri poll reported that support for 
the Kan Cabinet fell to 35% between 5 and 7 November ( a marked drop of 18 points since 
early October and a further drop of 31 points since mid-September); whilst a Kyodo News 
poll showed popular support for Mr Kan in November slipping to 32.7% from 47.6% in early 
October. The government of the hapless Prime Minister is in severe difficulty not only abroad 
but also at home.4 Correspondents have been quick to seize on these troubles, likening Japan 
to having become a “punching bag” between its two largest near neighbours, China and 
Russia. Japanese diplomacy, some maintain, has been unsteady since the DPJ came into 
power, focused mainly on domestic matters and only vaguely committed to pursuing a 
foreign policy more independent of that of its ally, the United States. The imbroglio with 
China and latterly with Russia has chastened the DPJ and enhanced the value of the US 
                                                            
2 T. J. Pempel, “Between Pork and Productivity: The Collapse of the Liberal Democratic Party”, THE JOURNAL 
OF JAPANESE STUDIES, 36, 2, (Summer 2010): 244, 252. 
3 Anonymous, “Poll Finds Distrust Between Japan, China”, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 8 November 2010. 
4 Anonymous, “Shaky Diplomacy Scuttles Kan Ratings”, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 8 November 2010. 
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alliance in the government’s mind, conspicuously toning down talk of greater foreign policy 
independence by Tokyo from Washington.5 More and more comment is being made about 
this evident re-direction of priorities and policy emphasis. The view is being expressed that 
Japan, shaken by China’s aggressive behaviour during the recent dispute over what is in fact 
a string of uninhabited islets, has now abandoned its earlier plans to make ties with Beijing a 
key pillar of a bold new foreign policy. Instead, Tokyo is falling back for support on its 
traditional ally the United States and is seeking succour from other Asian nations who share 
fresh Japanese doubts about the regional implications of China’s rise. Japanese scholar, 
Masaru Kohno of Waseda University in Tokyo, predicts that Japan and China will 
recommence speaking to each other at some point, though says that a significant number of 
Japanese are willing to sacrifice some economic well-being for the sake of a more principled 
position regarding China and that anti-Chinese feeling is growing more entrenched amongst 
Japan’s political class as well as ordinary people.6 
The beginning of the DPJ’s loss of public support and subsequent decline in electoral 
fortunes can be traced to the first serious upset for the party – this being the distressing 
resignations of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and of the Party Secretary General Ichiro 
Ozawa on 1 June 2010, after barely nine months at the helm. There were two main reasons 
for the luckless Prime Minister’s resignation: his failure to keep his promise to relocate the 
US Marine Corps Air Station from Futenma, Okinawa, and a political funds scandal that 
included his mother’s provision of some 1.26 billion yen (or around US$10.6 million) to him 
over a period of years. The immediate and most pressing reason, however, was his 
mishandling of the Futenma airbase issue.7  
During the August 2009 Election, Hatoyama had pledged to shift the airbase out of Okinawa 
Prefecture – and, if possible, out of Japan itself – by May of 2010. This promise was to be 
voided by the existence of an agreement in 2006 between the United States and the previous 
LDP government after 13 years of detailed negotiation. This plan was jointly endorsed on 28 
May 2010 by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and US Defence Secretary Robert Gates 
and their new Japanese counterparts, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and Defence Minister 
Toshimi Kitazawa. The new DPJ-led government was divided over the eventual site of the 
Base and all such proposals were ultimately rejected by the United States which insisted upon 
the terms of the original 2006 agreement. Hatoyama had wanted to split the Futenma 
functions by keeping a new helicopter pad at a new site of Henoko and by building a larger 
airfield some 200 kilometres northeast of Okinawa on the small island of Tokunoshima. 
Okada argued for a merger of the Futenma facilities with those of the US Air Force Base at 
Kadena on a 15 year lease. Kitazawa favoured the implementation of the 2006 plan, while 
Okinawa Governor Nakaima remained pointedly non-committal when issue flared up into 
local prominence. The US Administration, however, made no concessions whatever, opposed 
any splitting of the Futenma airbase, argued that any distance beyond 200 kilometres from 
                                                            
5 Tod Crowell, “Japan As Punching Bag”, ASIA SENTINEL, 8 November 2010. 
6 Peter Ford, “Japan Abandons Bid to Make China a Key Pillar of its Foreign Policy”, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, 17 November 2010. 
7 Joshy M. Paul, “Fall of Hatoyama: What Went Wrong?”, RSIS COMMENTARIES, 61, (15 June 2010): 1‐3. 
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the land station to the airfield caused unacceptable operational difficulties and maintained 
that continued transportation of Marines from Okinawa Camp Hansen and Camp Schwab via 
the helicopter unit at Futenma was vital to enable US forces to act swiftly in any contingency 
operations. Hatoyama’s bungled handling of the issue resulted in a large fall in his level of 
public support, plummeting from just under 70% at the commencement of his Premiership to 
less than 20%, following his deeply abashed back-tracking from his Campaign pledge to 
reluctant acceptance of insistent US demands. Worse, SDP Leader and Consumer Affairs 
Minister in the DPJ-led Coalition government, Mizuho Fukushima, was forced out of the 
Cabinet when she refused to abide by the decision to accept the 2006 Plan – paving the way 
for Hatoyama’s fall within a matter of days of her dismissal and the subsequent withdrawal of 
her and her small party from the troubled Coalition entirely.8 
 Hatoyama was forced to continue with the 2006 Plan for a number of inter-related, if 
unpalatable, reasons. First, keeping the US-Japan security alliance was of central importance 
for any Japanese government and the Americans rigidly contended that Okinawa was the 
focal point of the security pact and was in close tactical proximity to the potential flashpoints 
of North Korea and Taiwan. Second, the sinking of the South Korean naval ship Cheonan on 
26 March 2010 compelled Japan to comply with US demands, following regional confusion 
and anxiety over the incident, thus limiting Japan’s range of options. Third, Japan’s existing 
economic vicissitudes prevented its substitution of US military protection with indigenous 
capabilities in the event of the cessation of the long-standing security pact. Japan simply 
could not afford to build its own credible and effective defence infrastructure through highly 
constrained tax revenues, should the alliance with the US collapse. Hatoyama’s hands, 
therefore, were tied, and, faced with massive unpopularity and voter rejection at his 
unavoidable though nonetheless politically injurious climb-down, took the only creditable 
way out and resigned his office.9 
The next aspect of the further deterioration of the DPJ’s credibility and electoral standing can 
possibly be traced to its own questionable record of successfully implementing its ambitious 
and sweeping reformist Election Manifesto of 2009 along with the re-affirmation of this 
document in 2010. Following his re-election as DPJ Party President in September 2010 
against concerted rivalry from party power-broker and electoral tactician, Ichiro Ozawa, 
Prime Minister Naoto Kan issued a reconfirmed Manifesto entitled, “A Strong Economy, 
Robust Public Finances and Strong Social Security System” in which he stressed the creation 
by his government of a “New Japan” through the adoption of what he termed “The Third 
Way” (an approach that avoids excessive dependence on fiscal stimulus); the “Exhaustive 
Clean-Up of the DPJ” (based on the banning of political donations from corporations and 
organizations as well as the reduction of the number of Diet members); “Changing the ‘Shape 
of the Nation’” (through pursuing EPA and FTA initiatives, the realization of domestic local 
autonomy and self-reliance and the participation by ordinary people in the processes of public 
administration); and a commitment to “Reform [Starting] at the Grassroots” (a reformist 
assurance levelled at creating a “society of minimum unhappiness” through the elimination of 
                                                            
8 Ibid., 1‐3 
9 Ibid, 3. 
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war and crime, the prevention of diseases and the reversal of unemployment).10 High-
sounding words aside, the Prime Minister’s pledged undertakings have not lived up to 
expectations. According to his own document, the DPJ’s actual accomplishment of its 2009 
Manifesto, as of 11 June 2010, has not been as complete, thorough and wide-ranging as the 
government might have hoped. Of a total number of 179 policies, only 35 have been fully 
implemented and only a further 59 have been partially implemented – such figures 
constituting a fulfilment level of between only 19.6% and 52.5%.11 The growing public 
perception in Japan is that the DPJ has promised much more than what it has been capable of 
achieving – resulting in falling levels of electoral support and widespread disillusionment 
with the political process itself. 
In terms of security policy, under the DPJ, Japan is likely to pursue a more active stance, 
even though the DPJ is deemed to be more “dovish” than the LDP on issues of foreign policy. 
This is because the DPJ-led government faces the same external and internal situations that 
the LDP did. Externally, threats from North Korea, with its nuclear and missile capabilities, 
and the rise of China are likely to persist. As a result, Japan will continue to experience a fear 
of abandonment rather than one of entrapment in conflicts against its own interests, making it 
feel the need to do more to maintain US security assurances. At the same time, pacifism will 
continue to be an internal factor. Thus, although Japan is likely to continue playing a more 
active military role than it did during the Cold War period, it is unlikely to become the 
“Britain of the Far East”, a state that does not hesitate to conduct combat operations jointly 
with the United States or even independently.12 
Another matter affecting Japan’s perceived vital interests concerns the sovereignty of its sea 
borders. Although this is an issue that has not attracted much direct attention from the DPJ-
led government thus far, it does impact upon Japan’s territorial integrity and has been the 
subject of high-level international representations by Japan to the competent supra-national 
authorities. In November 2008, Japan took steps to “add” around 74,000 square kilometres of 
seabed to its maritime jurisdiction. Such areas, located seaward of the limits of the 200 
nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), are often referred to as the “outer” or 
“extended” continental shelf. According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal 
states can confirm their sovereign rights over areas of the continental shelf by making 
submissions to the United Nations’ Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (or 
CLCS) which considers the information provided and makes recommendations which form 
the basis of “final and binding” outer continental shelf limits. In 2009, a total of 17 
submissions had been lodged with the CLCS, including four states located or partially located 
in East and Southeast Asia – these being Indonesia, Japan, Myanmar and the Russian 
Federation. Russia was the world’s first state to submit a claim to the CLCS, doing so on 20 
September 2001. The submission, although predominantly concerned with the Arctic Ocean, 
                                                            
10 Naoto Kan, 94th Prime Minister of Japan, “The Democratic Party of Japan’s Policy Platform for Government 
(Manifesto)”, issued on 17 June 2010, The Democratic Party of Japan Headquarters, Nagata‐cho, Chiyoda‐ku, 
Tokyo, 2‐4, 17, Website ‐ www.dpj.or.jp. 
11 Ibid, 17. 
12 Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist Constraints on Japan’s 
Security Policy”, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 35, 2, (Fall 2010): 157‐158. 
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also related to the Sea of Okhotsk. Shortly after Russia’s submission, Japan delivered a 
diplomatic note to the Secretary General of the UN relating to Russia’s submission. In this 
communication, Japan objected to Russia’s use of basepoints located on the Islands of 
Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai in the maps used in the Russian submission on the 
basis that they are “inherent Japanese territory.” These Islands, of course, constitute disputed 
regions between Russia and Japan since their military seizure by the former Soviet Union in 
August/September 1945 and are known respectively as the Southern Kuril Islands (by Russia) 
and as the Northern Territories (by Japan.) In 2002, the CLCS suggested that Russia should 
make a revised submission. For the time being, the CLCS appears to have accepted Japan’s 
contention that a dispute with Russia exists and that the matter should be held over pending 
further detailed submissions and renewed adjudication. As of November 2010, however, the 
contested Islands still remain in unyielding Russian possession, a matter which Japan 
continues to regard as illegal and a violation of its territorial integrity.13 
Much of Japan’s future is linked to its relations with China, a matter of note, some might say 
of concern, to both nations and to both their governments. China’s economic rise and Japan’s 
political rise are the principal catalysts to an emerging East Asian order, but the mistrust 
between China and Japan is a daunting obstacle facing regional integration and cooperation. 
The “Two Tigers Dilemma” – whereby no two tigers can exist in the same territory – makes 
it difficult for the two countries to identify and institutionalize common interests. Sino-
Japanese competition profoundly affects the process of regional economic institution 
building. On security issues, suspicions and misgivings between the two countries exist, 
which complicate the development of mutual trust, mutual benefit and interdependence. 
Strategic mistrust between the two countries sharpens the East Asian security question and 
hinders multilateral security institution creation. Japan and China will therefore determine 
what happens in East Asia at its present strategic crossroads.14 Increased interdependence 
between the two major Asian rivals has given some hope for an end to the disputes that have 
marred their relationship. Nevertheless, in recent years, Sino-Japanese rivalry has escalated, 
fuelled by historical legacies and misunderstandings. The simultaneous development of 
military power by both countries has had an unsettling effect on their relationship. Japan has 
been developing a naval force with a modernized “Aegis” capability as part of a security 
burden sharing arrangement with the United States which could enable it to staunchly defend 
critical sealanes. Beijing sees this effort as a means to intervene in the Taiwan situation, or, in 
cooperation with the US, as an attempt to contain it. China itself also intends to develop a 
naval capability to protect its oil imports from the Middle East which would threaten the 
security of Japan’s sealanes. Potential naval rivalry is thus undermining the benefits of Sino-
                                                            
13 Clive Schofield and I Made Andi Arsana, “Beyond the Limits? Outer Continental Shelf Opportunities and 
Challenges in East and Southeast Asia”, CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA: A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
AND STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, 31, 1, (April 2009): 28‐29, 41‐43. 
14 Men Honghua, “East Asian Order Formation and Sino‐Japanese Relations”, INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUDIES, 17, 1, (Winter 2010): 51‐52. 
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Japanese interdependence, heightening difficulties in the relationship, rendering it more 
unpredictable and unstable.15 
Recent domestic political reform in Japan has been focused on addressing the problem of 
“money politics” and its associated issues of scandals involving prominent political figures 
and business interests. Money can “buy” influence, and vested interests, especially 
corporations, have financially benefited from ethically dubious connections between their 
profitable enterprises and overly-solicitous assistance from decision-makers who have been 
handsomely paid to act in the manner they have. It needs to be remembered, however, that 
Japan’s rise to economic power and prominence was based on mutually-supportive 
relationships between corporate enterprise on one hand and decision-making authority on the 
other. Between the 1920s and the 1970s, Japan developed a practice of “seisho” or a 
political/merchant relationship, linking both the state and business together. It is difficult to 
imagine, therefore, that business, at least in early industrializing Japan, could have 
entertained a policy of complete independence from the state. The manifold ties that drew the 
two sides together, regardless of substantive disagreements, ensured that they continued to 
strive for an even-keeled relationship. A conflicting choice of either business or government 
opting for cooperation or parting company and heading in different directions did not exist. 
The salient feature of the interaction was economic gain. Given this primary objective, the 
differences which occasionally divided the parties disappeared, producing a formidable unity 
in the face of international competition.16 
All that, however, commenced over 90 years ago. The present concern of Japan’s voters is 
with reform – encompassing political, economic, social, financial and international 
dimensions. In the modern context, the drive for reform became centred on the last, truly-
popular, LDP Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, who trumpeted this issue vigorously and, 
for a time, kept the illusion alive that great reforms were afoot. Those who closely scrutinized 
his actions, however, discerned that, months into his Administration, all Koizumi was doing 
was following the bidding of a group of senior officials inside the powerful Ministry of 
Finance. This reality simply reinforced the nostrum that Japanese politicians hardly ever 
make policy, but rather, officials do so. The unstated but paramount goal since the 1950s has 
been the expansion and preservation of industrial productive capacity for the sake of national 
strength, regardless of corporate profit-making. Japan’s reformist politicians, though, are 
expected to change that and to gain some control over Japan’s officialdom, which is 
sometimes seen as both omnipotent and unaccountable.17 
Another burning contemporary issue concerns Okinawa and the bitterly-contested retention 
of the US Marines’ Base there. Okinawans themselves are the most adamant opponents of a 
                                                            
15 Leszek Buszynski, “Sino‐Japanese Relations: Interdependence, Rivalry and Regional Security”, 
CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA: A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, 31, 1, (April 
2009): 144. 
16 Peter Von Staden, “How Reciprocal was the Business‐Government Relationship? The Wedge of Competition 
in Early Industrializing Japan”, ENTERPRISE AND SOCIETY, 10, 2, (June 2009): 261‐262. 
17 Karel Van Wolferen, “Lifting Japan’s Curse of Muddling Through”, THE ASIA‐PACIFIC JOURNAL, 22‐2‐09, (30 
May 2009). 
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continued American presence on their soil. Many believe that US forces are not in Japan for 
the protection of Japan or peace and stability in Asia, but for the projection of American 
power throughout Asia and the Pacific, even to the Middle East. Given the complexity of the 
Bases issue, Okinawans have little confidence that President Obama and Hatoyama 
successor, Prime Minister Kan, will bring much “change”, despite the moods of public 
optimism following the launches of their Administrations in 2009. What has ensued is a 
major power struggle between popular local opposition to Bases and the powerful vested 
interests that are promoting them.18 From Okinawa’s perspective, Japan’s independence 
appears to be only an illusion. Under this view, Japan is still a semi-independent or client 
nation unable to challenge or oppose American demands. For its part, Washington persists in 
saying that Henoko is the best relocation site if Japan wishes to maintain the American 
military deterrence capability, warning that the Marines’ presence could be required in the 
Pacific region should contingencies occur in the Korean Peninsula or the Taiwan Straits. As 
alluded to above, Okinawans believe that US Marines are stationed on their soil not to defend 
Japan but simply to hone their assault skills for combat operations elsewhere in the world. It 
is an agreeable and easy place in which to train, with Tokyo’s provision of large amounts of 
financial aid which Washington requires in the name of “host nation support.” Such support 
has been, and remains, substantial. In 2003, Japan’s direct “host nation support” amounted to 
US$3,228.43 million – a huge sum when compared to German and Korean support figures. 
Germany’s direct “host nation support” in the same year was US$28.7 million (just 1/112th 
that of Japan’s), whereas Korea’s direct “host nation support” in that year was US$486.31 
million (about 1/7th that of Japan’s). The combined amount of finance Japan has provided in 
support of USF operations in Japan since the system commenced in 1978 totals a remarkable 
US$30 billion.19 
Thus, Japan confronts its future, under a DPJ-led government which is experiencing 
increasing difficulty in retaining public confidence; in securing Parliamentary passage of its 
legislation; in dealing with China and the United States; and in initiating badly-needed 
economic recovery. The fresh and idealistic government that swept so confidently into power 
in August 2009 is finding itself increasingly mired in domestic and international realities 
which are proving to be more intractable and confounding than it envisaged and which are 
causing it to lose effective command and control of the outcomes it originally set for itself. 
THE DPJ AND CHINA: 
The Sino-Japanese relationship is very complex, featuring a long history of friendly relations 
and deep strategic distrust and mistrust. Both countries have recently realized that they must 
address their bilateral issues within a broader regional and global perspective. As one of the 
most complex bilateral relationships in the world, Sino-Japanese relations affect not only the 
two countries themselves, but also the entire East Asian region and the world itself. Historical 
legacies, political mistrust and security misgivings lead to complicated dilemmas between 
                                                            
18 Kageyama Asako and Philip Seaton, “Marines Go Home: Anti‐Base Activism in Okinawa, Japan and Korea”, 
THE ASIA‐PACIFIC JOURNAL, 14‐1‐10, (5 April 2010). 
19 Yoshio Shimoji, “The Futenma Base and the US‐Japan Controversy: An Okinawan Perspective”, THE ASIA‐
PACIFIC JOURNAL, 18‐5‐10, (3 May 2010). 
Japan Under The DPJ  Page 11 
 
China and Japan. Conversely, close economic cooperation and common security concerns 
indicate that interdependence between the two countries also exists. In this relationship, 
complexity contains both negative and positive aspects. Economic interdependence between 
China and Japan has been enhanced and the two countries enjoy ever-closer economic ties. 
Their bilateral trade volume in 2008 reached US$266.78 billion and Japan’s investment in 
China was US$65.38 billion by the end of 2008, second only to Hong Kong. The cumulative 
total of Japan’s Official Development Assistance to China from 1979 to 2007 reached 288.89 
trillion yen (or approximately US$2.427 trillion in 2007 US dollar values) and 41,162 
Japanese projects were implemented in mainland China by the end of 2008. In a word, Japan 
has been and continues to be an indispensable source of China’s capital, technology and an 
export outlet. China’s economic rise provides Japan with even more opportunities. China 
today is the leading exporter of products to Japan and the second largest destination for 
Japanese exports. China’s economic development has so far played a positive role in Japan’s 
own economic well-being, demonstrating the codevelopment that is achieved in their bilateral 
economic relations. Such interdependence would be costly to discontinue for either side and 
acts as a deterrent to severe conflict.20 
Yet, in political and security terms, both countries have been beset by antagonisms and deep-
seated suspicions, which magnify the implications of disputes, such as those involving the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the East China Sea. Bilateral relations are often mixtures of hot 
economics and cold politics and Sino-Japanese relations exhibit this mixture. In the broader 
picture, although distrust remains, bilateral interdependence continues to grow and the two 
governments are showing a desire to see an improvement in their bilateral relations. Sino-
Japanese relations are thus not a zero-sum game and any account that does not allow for their 
de-facto economic interdependence and political adjustments would be misleading.21 
Scholars of international politics and international law mark the beginnings of the modern 
international system with the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which ended brutal wars 
Europeans had fought with each other for decades. The system of independent, sovereign 
states that developed after these wars ended came to be known as the “Westphalian” system. 
Asian countries and peoples were incorporated into this Westphalian system through 
European and Western imperialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. After the end 
of the Cold War and the acceleration of globalization, experts began to speak of the world 
entering a “post-Westphalian” period. The end of US and Soviet ideological conflict and the 
border-crossing impact of globalization began to make Westphalian principles of sovereignty 
and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states look outdated and reactionary, 
prompting commentators to analyze the rise of “global governance.” The rise of Asia in 
global affairs could presage the emergence of an “Eastphalian” world order, enabling Asian 
countries to reshape international politics in ways that reflect Asian power, principles and 
practices more clearly. Asia’s increasing importance challenges Western-led universalism 
and European-led constitutionalism because Asian countries currently show little to no 
inclination to follow these directions in their relations with each other or the wider world. 
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How Asia, and especially China, might influence international relations is not clear and 
multiple possibilities exist.22 
China’s current leaders have recognized that, although the world may not yet be considered 
truly multi-polar in the military or strategic meaning of the word, the Asia-Pacific region has 
been moving in the direction of multi-polarity, in the sense that it is no longer possible for 
one or two states or ideological camps to hold sway over the entire region. The influence of 
the US, to the Chinese, has seemed to decline vis-a-vis the other regional powers, especially 
in terms of economic and financial strength. For its part, China considers itself a major, if not 
the main, pillar of stability and development in the Asia-Pacific region, contributing to peace 
and prosperity and pushing for greater involvement in, and integration of, regional 
governmental arrangements. Thus, coinciding with Chinese perceptions of the “renaissance”, 
“peaceful rise” or “peaceful development” of their country’s national strength and culture, 
previous sentiments of “victim-hood”  have largely been replaced by an image-consciousness 
of being, or having to be, a “responsible great power” and a full player in the international 
arena. A major endeavour of China’s foreign policy is to obtain a peaceful and secure 
environment for its economic and military modernization. This means first and foremost that 
China must maintain good relations with neighbouring states and become actively involved in 
Asian and Pacific affairs. Coupled with a “Good Neighbour Policy”, Hu Jintao in April 2005 
also pronounced a further concept, termed “Harmonious World”, allowing the Chinese 
leadership to augment its own interests and image by initiating cooperation to reduce tension 
and misunderstanding, to adopt measures to narrow the North-South economic gap and to 
undertake environment-friendly policies. China wishes to demonstrate its “Good Neighbour 
Policy” in Northeast Asia by using the ASEAN Plus Three as the main conduit for closer 
economic relations with Japan and South Korea. Aside from providing a large market for the 
exports of Japan and South Korea, a major purpose for China’s having good economic 
relations with these two countries has been its desire to revitalize aging and loss-making 
state-owned enterprises in its North-eastern region by attracting government funds and 
private capital investments from Japan and South Korea.23 
Danish scholar Thomas Pedersen, writing in 1998, raised the prospect of a peaceful and 
orderly power transition if an emerging power will assume the role of what he termed “a 
cooperative hegemon.” An important characteristic of a cooperative hegemon is that it is a 
regional power with limited military but vast economic capacity and extensive extraterritorial 
economic activities. A cooperative hegemon is interested in gaining secure access to markets 
of neighbouring states and finds it beneficial to create an extended home market out of the 
national markets of its neighbouring states – China fits this category. Beijing sees economic 
growth as the key to the development of its overall, comprehensive power, and does not 
simply rely on the military instrument to ensure its security. From its perspective, military 
power is necessary to defend China’s economic interests and development. However, 
                                                            
22 David P. Fidler, “Introduction: Eastphalia Emerging?: Asia, International Law and Global Governance”, 
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES, 17, 1, (Winter 2010): 2‐4. 
23 Chien‐peng Chung, “The ‘Good Neighbour Policy’ in the Context of China’s Foreign Relations”, CHINA: AN 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, 7, 1, (March 2009): 114‐115, 120. 
Japan Under The DPJ  Page 13 
 
economic security cannot be obtained through the military capability alone. The country’s 
political leadership believes that as China becomes more integrated into the global economy, 
the scope of national security has to be broadened to include the economic aspect. To 
accomplish rapid economic growth, China enhances regional and global economic 
cooperation, diversifies its external economic links and actively participates in regional and 
global production networks. Beijing can emerge as a peaceful and cooperative power except 
in one very important aspect – its ability to resolve its disputes with East Asia’s current 
hegemons. Beijing sees the United States as a global and traditional hegemon in East Asia 
and is willing to share management of the region with Washington. However, Beijing is 
asking for a concession that Washington will not give – a free hand in resolving the Taiwan 
issue. Certainly, Beijing will encounter difficulties in managing any potential US military 
intervention in a crisis. Consequently, it is modernizing its military forces to deter Taiwan 
from declaring independence and to thwart any US military action in a crisis situation. Such 
arms modernization, in turn, is viewed in Washington as part of Beijing’s long-term goal of 
easing the United States out of East Asia. China’s abnormal and tense relations with the 
current cooperative hegemon – Japan – can also overturn Beijing’s quest for a peaceful rise. 
China has been less accommodating to Tokyo than toward Delhi, Seoul and the ASEAN 
states. On one hand, China sees Japan as a major competitor for leadership in East Asia and 
an increasingly powerful and assertive offshore power that can contain China in the future. 
Japan, on the other hand, sees a rising China, along with other regional concerns, as a grave 
threat to its security. Thus, Japan has found it necessary to strengthen its security alliance 
with the United States. Beijing’s erratic relationship with Tokyo additionally poses a unique 
and complicated problem for China’s peaceful emergence in East Asia.24 
Concerning the US-Japan alliance, Chinese attitudes are exceedingly complex. Since the 
announcement in 1996 of guidelines for revising the US-Japan security treaty to specify more 
clearly the Japanese role in support of US military operations in the region, Chinese leaders 
have been increasingly worried about the possibility that this alliance could become a tool for 
defending a permanently separated or even a formally independent Taiwan. Many Chinese 
analysts believe, however, that a Japan within a bilateral alliance with the United States is 
still better than a Japan outside of such constraints – as long as this alliance is not used to 
provide military cover for an independent Taiwan. Some Chinese analysts argue that, in the 
post-Cold War era, the alliance has become a “bottle cap” on Japan and a constraint on 
Chinese and Russian power in the region. It is the alliance’s alleged second purpose – tying 
China down in a US-dominated security order – especially as it relates to the Taiwan issue 
that worries China’s leaders. Consequently, since the 1990s, China’s diplomacy toward the 
US-Japan alliance has been aimed largely at obtaining some kind of credible commitment – 
so far unsuccessful – that the alliance not be used to defend Taiwan in a conflict with the 
PRC. In essence, China prefers that the US-Japan alliance return to its pre-1996 form and 
function of constraining Japanese military power and assisting the United States to deter 
North Korea, though China does not want to see the alliance disappear entirely. In short, 
China’s wish to be richer and more powerful has not translated into a concerted military 
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effort to replace the United States as the predominant state regionally or globally, lending 
credence to Beijing’s often-repeated assertions that it wishes only to live in peace and 
security with its neighbours and with the world and that its diplomatic overtures are benign, 
as befitting a “status quo” rather than a “revisionist” power.25 
The global economic crisis has sparked an important change in the normative consensus in 
political economy. Previously, net importing countries were criticized for their lack of 
competitiveness and self-discipline whilst net exporting countries were praised for their 
manufacturing prowess and fiscal or consumer self-restraint. Such is no longer the case. Net 
exporters are losing some of their rectitude and net importers some of their shame. External 
balance has become fashionable again. Before the start of the financial crisis in 2007, much 
of the economic analysis of macroeconomic imbalances mirrored the “deficits and the dollar” 
debate of the 1980s, with China playing the role that used to be attributed to Japan. China’s 
surpluses attracted significant attention, yet analysts continued to focus on the size and 
sustainability of US current account deficits, emphasizing both the weakness of US domestic 
savings and the international role of the dollar. At some point, the argument went, the United 
States would face the risk that it would no longer be attractive to the suppliers of foreign 
credit, and China in particular. Once again, the scenario ended with the falling dollar taking 
the rest of the global economy along with it. All governments face the importance of 
nurturing domestic productivity growth. The questions revolve around how to go about it and 
how to sustain or achieve a cost-competitiveness. During the 1960s, West Germany chose to 
forego new investment to maintain cost-competitiveness. China currently faces a similar 
problem and has implemented a similar solution. The result has been a dramatic increase in 
Chinese holdings of foreign currency-denominated assets, some of which belonging to 
private actors but most belonging to the state. The Central Bank of China has accumulated an 
enormous stockpile of foreign exchange reserves and it has held these outside of the domestic 
economy by soaking up the resulting increase in Chinese currency through the issue of 
government (“sterilization”) bonds. This has had two different implications. First, it means 
that China does not benefit from the foregone investment. Foreign currency-denominated 
assets may generate a positive real rate of return, but they do not raise productivity and so 
cannot contribute to an increase in standards of living. Second, as long as China continues to 
focus on the relative cost dimension of its export competitiveness, the volume of foreign 
currency-denominated assets will continue to increase.26 
Moving from considerations of China’s economic security to China’s military security, some 
considerable scholarly debate has taken place over China’s “naval nationalism” and its 
related power-projection through expanded naval capabilities. Almost all Chinese and US 
analysts agree that China’s continental threat environment has improved dramatically. In the 
mid-1980s, Chinese leaders shifted the focus of China’s “military strategic guidelines” 
(junshi zhanlue fangzhen) from the Soviet Union to broader regional threats, placing greater 
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importance on the sea. In the post-Cold War era, China solved all of its land border disputes 
except those with Bhutan and India and it stabilized relations with continental neighbours 
through confidence-building measures, strategic partnerships and regional organizations. 
According to two Chinese experts, Liu Zhongmin and Wang Xiaojuan, “the security 
environment on China’s northwest and southwest land border is the best since 1949 and 
maybe even the best in China’s history” providing China the opportunity to “concentrate its 
resources on developing sea power.”27 As continental pressures on China have diminished, 
strategic pressures from the sea have become more salient. In addition to Taiwan 
independence, China’s greatest perceived security threats come from the naval and air forces 
of the United States and its allies. China has maritime disputes with several neighbouring 
countries, most notably in the East China Sea and South China Sea. Such matters have driven 
China towards significantly expanding its naval capacity whilst at the same time prompting 
its spokesmen and women into reassuring the Asia-Pacific region that such naval forces 
would be of limited power. A limited power-projection capability could help to demonstrate 
that China is a responsible major power willing to take on more international burdens as it 
becomes more powerful. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami appears to have been a turning 
point in the Chinese leadership’s support for an aircraft carrier. The US Navy’s rapid 
assistance not only highlighted the political value of naval forces, but also showed that China 
had a long way to go before it could participate effectively in such missions. Moreover, in 
terms of actual combat at sea, PLA Officers acknowledge that if China tried to use its aircraft 
carriers against the US Navy, they would be “sitting ducks” or “easy targets”, and that such 
deployment would be “suicidal.” Instead, they emphasize limited power-projection 
capabilities that in themselves are less likely to undermine China’s diplomatic relations.28 
Western commentators are prone to speculating about the political nature of China’s 
governing regime and on the possibility of China’s eventual adoption of full democratic 
practices through ending one-party rule by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). They raise 
the questions of whether or not China is a threat to democracy or whether or not democracy 
itself is a threat to China. Such commentators argue that China is not a market-Leninist 
system in which the economic imperatives of wealth expansion are in contradiction with the 
political imperatives of control-oriented, anti-market Leninist institutions. China has already 
evolved into a non-Stalinist authoritarianism. Somewhat similar transitions occurred in 
nineteenth century Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan, producing regimes that were 
readily compatible with sustained rapid growth. There are no historical forces, though, 
guaranteed to undermine China’s resilient authoritarianism. China is a successfully 
developing superpower determined to shape the world in directions consonant with the 
imperatives and priorities of its ruling groups – and, more especially, to preserve the CCP 
monopoly of power without accountability. China’s potential for democracy will largely be 
shaped by the dynamics of the Asian region and by internal groups and interests created by 
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rapid industrialization and urbanization coupled with globalization. In fact, China has 
evolved into a Singapore-type authoritarianism, manifested as a technocratic, professional, 
one-party administrative state. There are, though, political forces in, for example, Indonesia 
that are opposed to Beijing’s efforts in Southeast Asia to roll back the advance of democracy. 
Should Indonesia succeed in its opposition and should other nations in Southeast Asia as well 
as Pakistan and Bangladesh democratize, politically conscious Chinese may seek to 
accommodate regional democratization, especially if Taiwan and Singapore proved to be 
admirable democratic alternatives. Regional factors at present make this unlikely, though 
China’s democratization is not impossible. Given the difficulty of locating forces of regime 
instability or democratization in China, a more likely outcome is either continuity, that is, 
cumulative change toward a dominant-party populist presidentialism resembling Singapore, 
or a transition to a more jingoistic and militaristic direction. China is an emerging superpower 
probing, pushing and pulling the world in its own authoritarian course. Japan’s concept of 
leading China into an East Asian Community and showing China the way concerning 
environmental protection and shared high standards of living appears to be ephemeral. For 
Confucian China, China was the core, apex and leader of an Asian community. The CCP 
intends for authoritarian China to establish itself as a global pole. The US government will 
have difficulty being heard in Chinese ruling circles unless Americans abandon a 
democratization agenda that presupposes ending the leadership role of the CCP. The Chinese 
regime imagines a chaotic and war-prone world disorder of American-led democracy-
promotion being replaced by a beneficent Chinese world order of authoritarian growth with 
stability. Such is the nature of the democracy/authoritarian debate. Whilst there are dissident 
forces within China, they are uncoordinated and rigidly suppressed by the present CCP 
regime which continues to retain all power and is determined to keep overweening central 
control of the country it has ruled now for more than six decades.29 
What, then, of China’s relations with the other Northeast Asian giant, Japan? Sino-Japanese 
interdependence has developed rapidly over the past decade. China, including Hong Kong, 
displaced the United States as Japan’s major trading partner in 2004, while China, excluding 
Hong Kong, became Japan’s largest trading partner in 2007. In 1996, Japan’s trade with 
China excluding Hong Kong was US$62.2 billion while trade with the US was US$193 
billion. In 2007, trade with China reached US$236.6 billion while trade with the US dropped 
to US$208.2 billion. Japanese companies have relocated labour intensive industries in China 
and their products have been imported into Japan or exported to other markets. China’s 
comparatively lower wages and its willingness to serve as a production base for Japanese 
companies have been important factors in the maintenance of Japan’s global competitiveness, 
particularly in the electronics and telecommunications industries. Important as China has 
become to Japan, the US is still the first priority; exports to China in 2007 were 15% of total 
exports while the US took 20% of Japan’s total exports. The US also remains Japan’s first 
destination for FDI. At the end of 2007, Japan’s accumulated FDI in China was US$38 
billion, being dwarfed by total FDI in the US at US$174 billion. It is notable, however, that 
whilst both China and Japan have become increasingly interdependent, their rivalry has also 
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become accentuated. Closer contact with Japan has been accompanied by the belief of many 
Chinese and Koreans that Japan has not come to terms with its militaristic past and that 
Japanese society suppresses information about the crimes committed when the Japanese 
military occupied their countries. Chinese and Koreans were angered by Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi’s annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine which honours the spirits of Japan’s 
war dead, among which are included 1,068 convicted war criminals and 14 convicted Class A 
war criminals. Koizumi’s actions and his unusual obstinacy over this issue stifled Japan-
China relations for the duration of his term of office. In March 2005, extensive anti-Japanese 
riots erupted in China which were triggered by a revival of the textbook issue. Approved by 
the Japanese Education Ministry, school history textbooks, it was claimed, glossed over 
Japan’s wartime atrocities and provided a misleading and sanitized version of the invasion of 
China, the Korean comfort women issue and the annexation of Korea. There are also security 
concerns that China’s moves to protect its sealanes could further stimulate competition with 
Japan. China’s escalating dependence upon oil imports has created a fixation upon the 
security of its sealanes, especially the Malacca Straits through which some 80% of its oil is 
shipped. China currently imports around 47% of its oil and is the second largest oil consumer 
after the US. China is examining the possibilities of re-routing its oil supplies through 
pipelines in Mynamar or Pakistan, and is looking to increase oil supplies from Russia through 
pipelines in Western Siberia and Kazakhstan. Although such routes would diminish oil 
shipments through the Malacca Straits, they would not replace them entirely, making sealane 
protection an ongoing priority for the Chinese navy in the future. Chinese naval expansion in 
this area prompts Japanese fears that Beijing might gain a stranglehold over Japan’s own oil 
lifeline in the Malacca Straits, thus jeopardizing the supply of 87% of Japan’s oil needs. Sino-
Japanese rivalry in recent times may have been initially stimulated by disputes over history 
but it is increasingly being affected by events outside the bilateral relationship relating to 
China’s sealane vulnerability, the Taiwan issue and America’s role in the region. Ironically, 
therefore, China and Japan both need each other economically, but mistrust each other 
militarily.30 
China is deeply interested in the likely direction of Japanese foreign and security policy under 
the DPJ-led government. Disgraced former Party Secretary General, Ichiro Ozawa, who is 
now facing indictment for financial misreporting and misuse of party funds, did cultivate 
good relations with China, organizing high level visits by DPJ parliamentary delegations to 
Beijing, being met on one notable occasion by none other than the PRC President himself, Hu 
Jintao. The question now is in what direction will Prime Minister Kan lead his country? 
Many in Tokyo believe that Kan will fall into a nationalist/”realist” camp because some of 
his strongest supporters include pro-US nationalist/moderate adherents such as new Party 
Secretary General Katsuya Okada and new Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara. In fact, when he 
became DPJ leader earlier in June 2010 – he was re-elected in September 2010 – Kan said the 
US-Japan relationship is the foundation of Japan’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, in August 
2001, Kan pointed out that Japan should seriously examine the potential relocation of US 
Marines in Okinawa outside of Japan. Given the ongoing rise of China and an unstable 
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nuclear North Korea, none of the nationalist groupings in the Diet and elsewhere believe that 
the 60 year-old alliance with the United States should be abolished anytime soon. Most of 
them, though, continue to believe that Japan must re-establish its national pride and 
ultimately enhance its security by pursuing its own national security policy. In fear of a much 
closer relationship between Washington and Beijing, even pro-US nationalists such as Shinzo 
Abe may prefer more independence in security policy, while anti-US nationalists such as 
Yukio Hatoyama or Ichiro Ozawa could accelerate their tilt toward China if China-US 
relations were to strengthen. Japan may soon approach a juncture where it is confronted with 
two paths. One entails taking a more independent orientation, led by anti-American 
nationalists, that includes embracing Asia or China. The other path, led by pro-American 
nationalists, involves Japan’s embracing a US-UK model in which Tokyo plays an active role 
as a full partner with Washington. Each path is beset with difficulties. First, ancient distrust 
between China and Japan continues to this day despite some exchanges between political 
leaders. Japanese attempts to apologize to China for its wartime outrages are often spurned by 
the Chinese Communist Party which prefers to keep such issues alive for their own domestic 
political reasons. For years, predictions of Tokyo’s turning to Beijing, or even acting as a 
bridge between China and the West, have not materialized. Second, creating a British-style 
alliance with the United States on the other hand, as was advocated by some in the former 
Bush administration, presents its own problems. It is unlikely that the Japanese public is 
anywhere near the point where it would support a wholesale revision of Japan’s security 
arrangement along the lines of the US-UK model, with its commitment of troops, ships and 
aircraft to battlefield conditions and active combat in war zones. The political will for such a 
radical reversal of over 60 years of non-violent pacifism simply does not exist and no 
Japanese government, however nationalistic in its outlook, would dare to attempt to foist such 
a policy upon a highly unwilling populace. All of these factors in Japan are being watched 
quietly but closely by China, which is drawing its own conclusions and deciding its own 
contingency plans.31 
Turning from China’s interface with Japan to its potential relations with the United States, 
much will depend upon the forms and substance of China’s military build-up and its maritime 
capabilities. The United States is already critical of China’s lack of transparency concerning 
its annual military spending and the true extent of its arms modernization programme. 
Official Chinese figures state that China spent some US$60 billion in 2009 on the PLA; 
whereas SIPRI estimates were that US$98.8 billion was spent and Pentagon estimates were as 
high as US$150 billion. The United States, however, still dwarfs Chinese defence spending 
and military capacities – with Washington disbursing US$663 billion on its military in 2009 
and its nuclear forces in January 2010 consisting of 9,600 deployed and reserved warheads in 
contrast to China’s 240 deployed and reserved warheads. The United States is thus 
outspending China by 442% on defence and its nuclear arsenal outstrips that of China by 
4,000%.32 Since China began its rise to great power status in 1978, US-China relations have 
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avoided much of the instability and great power rivalry associated with the US-Soviet 
competition. The development of the Chinese economy, the growth of central government 
revenues and annual double-digit increases since the mid-1990s in the Chinese defence 
budget have yet to yield China military capabilities or great power ambitions that 
fundamentally affect the regional security order and vital US interests. Nonetheless, recent 
developments in Chinese politics and defence policy suggest that China will soon embark on 
a more ambitious maritime policy, beginning with the construction of a power-projection 
navy centred on an aircraft carrier. Just as nationalism and the pursuit of status encouraged 
past land powers to seek great power maritime capabilities, nationalism, rather than security, 
is driving China’s naval ambition. China’s maritime power will be limited by the constraints 
experienced by all land powers – extensive challenges to territorial security and a 
corresponding commitment to a large ground force capability. China’s naval nationalism will 
however challenge US-China cooperation. It will increase US naval spending and 
deployments and politicize China policy in the United States. China’s naval nationalism will 
not challenge US maritime security but it will challenge US-China diplomatic cooperation. 
The challenge for the United States will be to develop a measured military response to 
China’s naval nationalism while avoiding unnecessary and costly bilateral tension. This will 
not be easy. The combination of China’s naval expansion and the US military response may 
suggest a naval arms race. China’s development of carrier-based naval capabilities will 
resonate with the American public and over time promote a perception of China as a credible 
threat to US security. An aircraft carrier will not only symbolize China’s great power status to 
its people, it will also signal to Americans China’s intention to challenge US maritime 
security. China’s development of a carrier-centred naval capability will increase US-China 
military competition. Yet such great power maritime rivalry will not intrinsically make such 
competition inherently unmanageable. The impact of US-China maritime rivalry can be 
effectively contained. China’s naval expansion and its influence on international politics will 
reflect the enduring asymmetric geopolitical constraints stemming from grossly unequal US 
and Chinese maritime capabilities. It will also reflect the constraining impact of nuclear 
weapons on great power use of force. China may be pursuing an ambitious maritime policy 
but there are diplomatic and military checks and balances in place, especially involving the 
US, which will constrain China’s ability not only to impose its will unilaterally on the Asia-
Pacific region but also its capacity to coerce regional states into submitting to Chinese 
demands, should it ever attempt to do so. 33 
It is perhaps appropriate to conclude this section of the discourse by referring to Chinese and 
Japanese interpretations of the respective intentions of the other. It has already been noted 
that whilst China and Japan are mutually benefiting from a burgeoning and highly profitable 
economic relationship, both countries harbour doubts and misgivings about the other 
politically and militarily. Many of Japan’s leaders, officials and defence planners worry that 
the growth and aggressiveness of the Chinese military could alter the political and economic 
order of the East China Sea. These Japanese leaders are distressed by an inability to define 
and manage increasing Chinese military and political power. More specifically, Japan fears 
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the disruption of shipping routes through the East China Sea, the loss of the Senkaku Islands, 
the loss of Taiwan’s de-facto independence and the loss of energy sources. Currently, 
Japanese leaders and defence planners resist China’s regional domination and perceived 
aggression in the East China Sea. Any major disruption in sea traffic would be devastating to 
Japan’s economic well-being. Japanese leaders interpret Chinese policies and military 
incursions as aggressive behaviour. Chinese leaders, for their part, perceive Japanese policy 
as aggressive as well. Japan fears that China intends to dominate the sea, energy resources 
and the Islands referred to by some Chinese leaders as the “Diaoyu Blockade.” China alleges 
that Western and Japanese imperialist designs carved up its seas, looted its maritime 
resources and occupied its reefs and islands. In this light, Chinese policies are, in the words 
of Chen Jie of Yale University, “a long overdue and legitimate action to protect its territorial 
integrity.” Essentially, Chinese leaders have taken steps that they believe will ensure China’s 
security and there is no reason to expect a reversal in its military expansion, given present 
reasoning. China’s leaders anticipate the full remilitarization of Japan, the commencement of 
Japan’s offensive capabilities, the strengthening of the military alliance between Japan and 
the US, as well as the strengthening of tacit military ties between Japan and Taiwan. Indeed, 
policies stemming from such a mindset can be misconstrued as threats of force, causing 
opposing nations to mirror each other’s behaviour. Japan, feeling threatened by the expansion 
of the Chinese military, has enhanced the projection of the Self Defence Force and 
commenced alliances and treaties. Military preparedness is increasingly understood by 
Japanese policy-makers as necessary in order to deter incentives for aggression that they 
believe are currently influencing Chinese policymaking. Both China and Japan, however, 
have matching security concerns involving sea lanes, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and 
Taiwan and both have consequently engaged in encroaching military, economic and 
diplomatic strategies. Japan’s involvement in ballistic missile defence and China’s growing 
submarine fleet are worsening their respective fears and have the potential of leading to dire 
circumstances. There are still grounds for a cautiously optimistic hope, however, in that both 
Japan and China can improve relations by heeding their security concerns about each other 
and by showing at the same time a sincere readiness to engage in diplomacy. In the end, both 
sides know that their differences can only be settled by dialogue not destruction and that 
living peacefully is a far better prospect than dying violently.34 
THE DPJ AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 
The central issue for Japan’s foreign policy under the DPJ-led Coalition government is the 
same as it has been for many years – how should it handle, on one hand, its alliance with the 
United States and, on the other, its relationship with its Asian neighbours? The rise of China 
and the tensions in the Japan/China relationship now tend to eclipse Japan’s relations with 
other Asian countries in the public mind, but in reality all are bound together. But what of the 
relationship with the United States? It always looked as this might be irksome. The DPJ 
includes a wide variety of opinion, from people like Seiji Maehara, who staunchly support the 
US-Japan Security Treaty, right through to former members of the old Socialist Party, who 
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plainly do not. In 2007 the DPJ strongly opposed the continuation of Japan’s participation in 
US-led naval operations in the Indian Ocean as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. The 
then US Ambassador had his first meeting with Ozawa at the height of this disagreement and 
he found it a bruising experience live on television. The DPJ have also had longstanding 
objections to the arrangements governing the US Bases in Japan. In the 2009 Manifesto, at 
the last minute they toned down some of their previous positions, but it still called for “the 
revision of the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement” and it proposed to “move in the 
direction of re-examining the realignment of the US military forces in Japan and the role of 
US military Bases in Japan.” Its central message was that US-Japan relations should be 
“close and equal.” The US-Japan alliance would still be the foundation of Japan’s foreign 
policy, but Japan and the US would work out their respective roles only after Japan had 
developed its “autonomous foreign policy strategy.”35 
In Asia, the end of the Cold War did not eliminate the desire for US protection. In addition to 
general concerns about the stability of governments in North Korea, Indonesia and elsewhere, 
a number of Asian countries share US concerns about the long-term implications of Chinese 
economic growth. As China continues to grow and develop, it is likely to translate that 
increased economic strength into greater military power and regional influence. In addition to 
Taiwan (which has long sought US protection against pressure from the PRC), Asian 
countries like Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and India 
continue to welcome a close strategic partnership with the United States. There some five 
responses to the creation of an alliance system by member states – these involving “hard 
balancing” (the formation of a countervailing coalition to contain the strongest state); “soft 
balancing” (the acceptance of the prevailing balance of power but assembling countervailing 
coalitions designed to thwart or impede specific policies); “neutrality” (offering neither 
resistance nor support to the predominant power); “bandwagoning” ( the choice of alignment 
with the strongest or most threatening state in a form of appeasement seeking to convince the 
dominant power to leave threatened states alone); and “regional balancing” (the alignment of 
states with the dominant power where the threat to be countered is a neighbouring power or 
some other local problem.) These various strategies offer a fairly complete accounting of the 
most common motivations for alliance, though they are ideal types and reality will usually be 
considerably more complex. States may align with the United States as regional balancers (as 
Japan has clearly done) but then engage in various forms of soft balancing (as in the Six Party 
Talks) in order to pressure the United States to act as it wishes. Similarly, one can see major 
powers such as China collaborating with the United States on certain issues (such as counter-
terrorism), while simultaneously attempting to build other relationships intended to enhance 
its influence over time (and reduce that of the United States.)36 
The question arises as to why the United States pursued a network of bilateral alliances in 
East Asia following the end of World War II rather than the multilateral security alliances it 
preferred in Europe, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. In East Asia the United States 
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cultivated discrete and exclusive postwar relationships with the Republic of Korea (ROK), 
the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) and Japan. Famously referred to by John Foster 
Dulles as the “hub and spokes” system, these bilateral arrangements still constitute the most 
striking and enduring element of the security architecture of East Asia. Numerous 
international relations scholars have advanced explanations for Asia’s bilateralism but, 
according to Victor Cha of Georgetown University, they all overlook the critical causal 
variable of US preferences: the desire for maximum and exclusive control over potentially 
dangerous allies. Cha argues that bilateralism emerged in East Asia as the dominant security 
structure because of what he terms the “powerplay” rationale behind US postwar planning in 
the region. He defines “powerplay” as the construction of an asymmetric alliance designed to 
exert maximum control over the smaller ally’s actions. The United States created a series of 
bilateral alliances in East Asia to contain the Soviet threat, but a congruent rationale was to 
constrain anticommunist allies in the region that might engage in aggressive behaviour 
against adversaries that could entrap the US in an unwanted larger war. Underscoring the US 
desire to avoid such an outcome was a belief in the “domino theory” – that the fall of one 
small country in Asia could trigger a chain of countries falling to communism.37 
The powerplay theory applies slightly differently to Japan, because only in that country did 
the United States attempt to reshape internal institutions to prevent the Japanese from 
engaging in unilateral aggression. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations understood 
that Japan was the only country in the region that could seek great power status after World 
War II. US policy-makers initially attempted to embed Japan in a regional framework to 
assist in its postwar recovery, just as they were doing with Germany in Europe. But when this 
failed, they opted to develop a tight bilateral alliance with Japan. The powerplay in this 
relationship was to “win Japan” as an ally – that is, to exercise decisive influence over 
Japan’s transformation from a defeated wartime power into a status quo power supportive of 
US interests in the region, thereby limiting the potential for renewed aggression.38 
The United States executed its powerplay strategy toward Japan with greater subtlety than it 
did toward Taiwan and South Korea. The strategy was not tied to fears that, like Chiang or 
Rhee, Shigeru Yoshida, Japan’s first postwar Prime Minister, might try to start a new war in 
Asia. At the same time, though, controlling Japan did not mean emasculating it. The choice 
was to shape Japan through one of three options: the “alpha” option, the “gamma” option, or 
the “beta” option. The alpha option called for a harsh treaty settlement that would have 
confined Japan to its home islands and allowed it to maintain only modest defence 
capabilities. The gamma option encouraged the development of a militarily independent 
Japan capable of defending itself against communism and projecting force in the region. It 
called for an early end to the Occupation, a favourable peace treaty settlement and the 
acceleration of Japan’s build up as a bulwark against communism. Emerging between the 
alpha and gamma options, the beta option sought to create a postwar Japan that was not too 
weak but not too strong. The strategy sought to create deep, robust ties to the United States 
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and thereby modulate Japanese growth and development in a direction beneficial to US 
interests. The United States therefore saw the mutual defence treaty with Japan, signed on 8 
September 1951, as serving two purposes. One was to build a bulwark against communism. 
The other was to control, manage and restrain Japan’s reintegration into the international 
system.39 
Such is the background to present-day US-Japan relations - predicated on an alliance that has 
spanned six decades; seen the rise of Japan to being an economic powerhouse; witnessed the 
end of the Cold War and the triumph of the capitalist West over the communist Soviet Union; 
and confront the newer dangers of terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation. The Obama 
administration took office in 2009 and was determined to move beyond the power-politics 
unilateralism of the Bush Junior years, intending to reassert America’s global influence and 
standing as the most principled and powerful guarantor of rule-based multilateralism. 
President Obama set out to rebuild the world’s faith and confidence in the integrity and ethics 
of US foreign policy, which his predecessor in The White House had done so much to 
tarnish. With respect to China, Obama’s approach was presented as a doctrine of “strategic 
reassurance.” Although beginning with optimistic hope, the policy has not yielded the 
systemic breakthroughs that the Obama administration hoped to achieve on climate change, 
non-proliferation, Middle East security and warmer US-China relations. Instead, increasingly 
stinging exchanges between Beijing and Washington display the contradictions inherent in 
attempting to “shoehorn” an authoritarian, mercantilist and suspicious nation into a 
refurbished world system that ostensibly promotes democracy, open markets and 
multilateralism while forcefully advancing American interests. Currently, the Obama 
administration seems to have accepted a world of lowered expectations and is striving for a 
more achievable goal of advancing US power at China’s expense. Friction with China has 
emerged as a regular feature of US diplomacy – a means to gain kudos at the expense of an 
unpopular, uncooperative, and, for the present, diplomatically and militarily weaker regime. 
US China policy today seems like antiquated “rollback”, the effect of which being to isolate 
China instead of incorporating it into a mutually-beneficial multi-polar system.40 
President Barack Obama came to power facing daunting domestic and foreign crises. The 
United States preceded world economies into steep decline in 2008 and has continued falling 
in 2009/2010. Active efforts by the US and other governments to deal with the causes and 
effects of the global financial crisis have showed little signs of substantially reversing 
economic fortunes. Economic calamity overshadowed what had been expected to be the new 
US government’s most salient preoccupation – the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the 
violence and instability in the broader Middle East-Southwest Asian region. In 2009, 
continued progress in stabilizing security in Iraq and transferring responsibilities to the Iraqi 
government opened the way for the anticipated withdrawal of US combat forces. Conversely, 
the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan meant that US combat forces would be 
significantly increased in order to counter the resurgence of Taliban attacks and their 
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expanding administrative control, threatening to undo the gains won following the overthrow 
of the oppressive Taliban regime by US-led forces in 2001. Against this background, US 
relations with the rest of the Asia-Pacific region seemed to be of generally secondary 
importance to US policy-makers. The global economic crisis put a premium on close US 
collaboration with major international economies, notably Asian economies like China and 
Japan, in promoting domestic stimulus plans and avoiding self-serving protectionist measures 
that would encumber early world economic growth. Pyongyang, though, climbed to the top of 
the Obama government’s policy agenda through a string of provocative actions in 2009, 
culminating in North Korea’s withdrawal from the Six Party Talks and its second nuclear 
weapons test in May. Concerning Japan, domestic political turmoil (typified by a succession 
of weak and unpopular Prime Ministers following Koizumi’s departure from office in 2006) 
was compounded by a major decline in the export-oriented Japanese economy as a result of 
the 2008 global economic crisis. Despite such weaknesses and upsets, Japan remains the third 
largest economy in the world, with great technological prowess and modern, capable armed 
forces. US leaders count on Japan to work with the United States in dealing with the 
economic crisis; in managing the threats posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons and other 
provocations by that unpredictable, aggressive regime; and in sustaining regional peace 
through contingency plans aimed at circumventing possible disruptive actions by a rising 
China and other potential sources of regional instability. Japan has also developed and 
demonstrated a strong willingness to share its leading expertise and experience in managing 
environmental and climate change matters – key priorities of the Obama government.41 
Japan and South Korea (the Republic of Korea or ROK) are the United States’ two most 
important allies in East Asia. Approximately 28,000 American troops are stationed in South 
Korea, with another 33,000 in Japan. The United States has separate security alliances with 
South Korea and Japan – part of what former Secretary of State John Baker referred to in 
1991 as a “fan spread wide, with its base in North America and radiating west across the 
Pacific.” Both alliances have been long-lasting: the alliance with Japan dates to 1950, with an 
upgrade in 1960, and the US-ROK alliance was signed in 1953. Although the alliances have 
succeeded in preventing other countries from committing full scale aggression against South 
Korea and Japan, it is unclear how effective they would prove to be should they be tested by 
a major incident originating in, say, North Korea, because Japan and the ROK have no 
security alliance with each other. In late November 2010, just such a potential security threat, 
originated by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), has swirled into regional 
and international focus, with the repeated artillery shelling by North Korea of the small South 
Korean Island of Yeonpyeong, killing four people and forcing the evacuation of hundreds of 
civilians. Perhaps the best the United States can do to optimize the effectiveness of the South 
Korea-Japan segment of its Asian alliance mechanism is to renounce its policy of pre-
emptive attack and restrain itself from invading other countries, except as part of a 
cooperative United Nations or other international effort. Many South Koreans still see a 
similarity between the former imperialistic policies of Japan and the current foreign policies 
of the United States. The US also needs to be very careful in the manner in which it engages, 
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if at all, with the Kim Jong Il regime in North Korea. If the US bargains with the regime by 
accepting it on its own merits in return for a freeze on its nuclear weapons programme, the 
Japanese, who rely heavily on the US to apply pressure on North Korea over humanitarian 
issues such as the abduction of Japanese citizens, will become further disillusioned with the 
United States. The South Koreans will also be disappointed if the US moves ahead with its 
own North Korean policy without consulting Seoul – especially if the ROK is asked to 
finance an arrangement made in Washington. The US alliances with Japan and South Korea 
must be preserved to keep the peace in Northeast Asia. North Korea still needs to be deterred 
and the other countries in the region need to know that they face US constraints on their use 
of military power. In regard to China’s power projection, the constraints imposed by a US 
regional presence will reassure Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Similarly, if the United 
States acts as a guarantor of regional peace, China and South Korea should be assured that 
the United States will constrain Japanese projection of power.42 
THE DPJ AND NORTH KOREA: 
North Korea has a population of some 22 million people and is ruled by a Stalinist one-party 
regime that tolerates no dissent and which adopts a “cult of personality” around its leader, 
sustained by rigid social control supported by the armed forces. Malnutrition is widespread, 
owing to frequent and acute food shortages for most of the population, and the economy is 
close to the point of collapse, being propped up by foreign aid from the regime’s only ally, 
China, and by trafficking in narcotics and counterfeit currency. Its scarce resources are 
harnessed to the purchase of arms for its 1.1 million-strong military and to the development 
of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. It is often described as “the hermit state”, 
owing to its deliberate isolation from the outside world and to its blanket secrecy involving 
all aspects of government policy and decision-making. It is regarded by Japan with extreme 
suspicion and outright condemnation – given that it has not only abducted Japanese citizens 
to help train North Korean spies but that it also threatens Japan’s security by means of missile 
attack capable of launch at any time causing devastation and widespread casualties. The 
regime itself is unpredictable in its actions and is often aggressive and provocative towards its 
regional neighbours, the United States and the rest of the world. Analysts differ as to the 
mental stability of its rulers – some arguing that the elite is dangerously disturbed, whilst 
others arguing that the elite is meticulously astute and all its actions are carefully planned 
prior to their implementation. The family “dynasty” which rules this totalitarian state has thus 
far carried out effective transitions of power from father to son – the latest being from the 
“dear leader”, the ailing Kim Jong-Il, to his third son, Kim Jong-Un, now known as the 
“brilliant comrade.” Predictions of the regime’s imminent collapse have existed now for 20 
years, though, somehow, in the face of strict sanctions and widespread international censure, 
this ruthlessly authoritarian state maintains its being and shows no outwardly visible signs of 
dissolution or political overthrow. 
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The Kim regime relies on several tools of authoritarian control to stay in power; these 
including restrictive social policies, manipulation of ideas and information, the use of force, 
manipulation of foreign governments and institutional coup-proofing. These tools help to 
explain its seemingly puzzling survival and suggest that a revolution or coup d’etat in North 
Korea remains unlikely. The regime divides North Korean society into classes – these being 
“core”, “wavering” or “hostile”. Class, or songbun, is determined by socio-economic origin. 
At the top is the working class with family members who fought against Japan or South 
Korea. The bottom caste includes those with relatives who had been landed elites or Japanese 
collaborators, who fought for the South or who were judged as disloyal to Kim Il-Sung. 
Upward mobility is difficult for most and impossible for some, though one’s songbun is 
easily demoted for perceived disloyalty, marriage to someone in a lower class or a relative’s 
transgression. In North Korea, one’s class determines where one lives, how much food one 
eats and whether one is assigned to sit in a comfortable office or toil in a dangerous 
mineshaft. Since the “great leader” Kim Il-Sung created the class system, people considered 
wavering or hostile have been assigned a harshly low quality of life. Perceived enemies of the 
regime (if spared) were banished to the countryside or imprisoned in camps, where 
malnourishment is high and where most famine deaths occur. By contrast, Kim Jong-Il 
bestows a comfortable life on the core class in exchange for its loyalty. Members of this class 
receive the safest and most desirable jobs working for the regime. The most favoured among 
the elite receive positions in Kim’s network of trading companies, giving them coveted 
access to hard currency. Members of the elite reside in Pyongyang and live at the top of the 
five levels of housing in the country. They receive more plentiful and better food – those 
receiving the most and best food being members of the internal security services, the military 
and high-level officials. The core class has access to special stores that sell coveted products 
such as leather (as opposed to vinyl) shoes, wool (rather than synthetic) clothing, red meat, 
liquor, chocolate and eggs. Most North Koreans at best obtain such luxuries only on special 
holidays, whilst elites buy them year round at discounted prices and without standing in long 
queues. Lavish gifts are bestowed on members of the “selectorate” including imports such as 
luxury cars, watches, stereos and television sets. Defectors even report that cadres are 
rewarded with wives, who enjoy large (by North Korean standards) pensions, having retired 
in their twenties from the “Happy Corps”: a group of beautiful young women who serve Kim 
Jong-Il as staffers and entertainers.43 
Revolution is unlikely in totalitarian North Korea. Social policies have stunted the 
development of social classes critical to the onset and success of revolution and they have 
obliterated any independent civil society. It is possible that the populace is simply frightened 
and mouths nationalistic slogans. But if the populace is dissatisfied with the regime, the 
state’s brutal use of force (or threat of force) suppresses individual disloyalty or popular 
mobilization. The North Korean people may be hungry, may despise Kim Jong-Il and may 
envy their rich neighbours, but they are unlikely to mobilize. As Andrei Lankov noted in 
2008, during the famine, “North Korea’s starving farmers did not rebel. They just died.” 
Every indication is that the regime will continue to have the funds needed to co-opt its 
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supporters. In dealing with North Korean nuclear weapons acquisition, the United States’ 
policy has not significantly changed from Bill Clinton to George W. Bush to Barack Obama. 
Future US administrations will be similarly troubled by the instability of a Korean transition 
and may be similarly inclined towards a policy of limited accommodation and engagement. 
Beijing, which gives 50,000 tons of oil each month to North Korea is likely to continue to 
shoulder its ally. North Korea, with its callous and arrogant disregard for international norms 
and human life, may at some point cross a “red line” leading to a decision to topple the Kim 
regime. Short of Pyongyang’s selling fissile material to al-Qaida, however, one wonders what 
“red lines” North Korea has not already crossed and thus far not having been brought 
substantially to book. In short, Pyongyang will probably have the funds it needs to continue 
bribing its selectorate and security forces. Kim Jong-Il is likely to leave power not because of 
mutinous cadres or angry masses, but because he dies in office. Sanctions aimed at 
weakening the broader North Korean economy are unlikely to have much coercive effect: 
Kim Jong-Il (like Stalin, Saddam and many other dictators) protects his selectorate and shifts 
the burden of sanctions to the people. A better economic lever with which to move the Kim 
regime would be to directly threaten its access to hard currency and luxury goods, which it 
needs to bribe the selectorate. Policies of freezing North Korean assets overseas and the 
embargo on luxury items are more promising. Kim Jong-Il, though, will not give up his 
nuclear arsenal easily and is likely to dishonour hard-won agreements. The weapons not only 
deter adversaries, they serve as a tool of regime survival. They help to curry favour with the 
military and provide a bargaining chip that earns the regime billions of dollars of hard 
currency. Limited military operations undertaken against North Korea with the goal of 
inciting a coup or popular revolt are unlikely to succeed. Coercive bombing alone rarely 
incites a popular revolt and often strengthens a regime by inflaming popular nationalism and 
increases the military’s loyalty to the leadership. The only viable military option for 
overthrowing the regime would be large-scale invasion.44 
Despite decades of misrule and a deteriorating economy under Kim Jong-Il, his regime 
enjoys broad support from their own people who see America and its South Korean ally as 
the source of all trouble. From this perspective, North Koreans view Kim’s weakening health 
(possibly including pancreatic cancer in addition to the stroke he had in 2008) with great 
sympathy, since they consider it to be a result of his relentless hard work to protect his people 
against Western imperialism. Social unrest and public protests tend to be isolated and limited 
to marginal segments of North Korean society in remote areas. Large segments of the 
population, especially in Pyongyang, are believed to be loyal to the regime under the tight 
control of the military, police and state apparatus. Public expressions of displeasure (whether 
over controlling the burgeoning black market or the deteriorating economy) never reach the 
level of large-scale revolt against the regime itself. The majority of North Koreans blame 
their misery arising from the so-called “arduous march” on the hostile policies of the United 
States and their southern neighbour. For Kim Jong-Il and his eventual successor, growing 
tension and crisis with Seoul and Washington serve the important domestic political 
objectives of shoring up popular support especially at this critical time of power transition. 
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As Kim Jong-Il faces the double challenge of managing regime transition under increasing 
economic and international political isolation, he needs outside help. China figures 
prominently in this. Today, China’s influence and sway is increasingly felt by its neighbours 
and the rest of the world through its fast growing economy. China has been an important 
supporter of the North Korean regime both politically and economically for a considerable 
time now. Since the 1990s, China has provided North Korea with up to 90% of its fuel, 80% 
of its daily consumer goods and 40% of its food supply. Given its diplomatic and economic 
isolation, North Korea has become increasingly dependent on China’s life support. Beijing is 
strongly concerned with maintaining North Korean stability and the Kim regime may well 
calculate that it can survive as long as it manages to keep a positive relationship with its giant 
neighbour. Despite tightening international economic sanctions under United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1784, bilateral trade between China and North Korea 
reached US$2.8 billion in 2008, an increase of 41.3% from 2007. For as long as Kim Jong-Il 
needs China’s help, Beijing can enjoy increased leverage over Seoul and Washington as well 
as Pyongyang. Further, Pyongyang may attempt to increase the stakes of its hard line policy 
toward Seoul and Washington whilst it knows it can continue to rely on China’s support. 
China, for its part, has tried to keep a delicate balance between exercising pressure against 
North Korean nuclear defiance and providing a life support for the DPRK’s crumbling 
economy. At the same time, Beijing faces a growing dilemma between shoring up the Kim 
regime and alienating South Korea and the United States. Should Kim decide to raise the 
stakes with Seoul and Washington (as the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents strongly 
indicate), Beijing will be in an invidious position of protecting an unruly Kim Jong-Il at the 
risk of damaging important partnerships with the two countries. Such a Chinese policy would 
also drive Seoul into a closer alliance with Washington. As much as China wants to increase 
its influence and leverage over North Korea (such Chinese influence being far from absolute 
and unbounded), it has a strong interest in maintaining peace and stability in the region. 
Pyongyang’s unruly, provocative and aggressive behaviour against South Korea and the 
United States only makes matters more unstable and refractory. Beijing cannot afford to have 
a situation where matters are spiralling out of control and thus has a common interest with the 
ROK and the US in checking the DPRK’s more dangerous behaviour. In the long run, China 
wishes to see a more moderate North Korean regime which embraces economic reforms and 
an opening up to the rest of the world. It also desires the denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula and the removal of the threat of nuclear attack upon neighbouring states, 
particularly South Korea and Japan, which China knows are well armed with both defensive 
and offensive weaponry and are capable of inflicting extensive devastation on any regional 
aggressor in case of an onslaught.45 
As the third largest economic power in the world, a key US ally in the Asia-Pacific region, a 
perennial rival to China and North Korea’s nearest “enemy”, Japan’s response to its security 
threats and concerns will have important ramifications in what is becoming an ever more 
fluid regional security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. Japanese public uneasiness 
towards North Korea has been directly caused and worsened by that country’s ballistic 
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missile and nuclear tests. North Korea fired a Taepodong-1 ballistic missile over Japanese 
airspace in August 1998, declared its possession of nuclear weapons in 2003 and 
subsequently fired a short-range missile off its East Coast on 1 May 2005. Ignoring protests 
from the United Nations and other powers such as the United States, Japan and China, North 
Korea has carried out some seven missile tests since October 2006. As early as in 2003, 
Pyongyang was thought to have enough fissile material to make two or three nuclear bombs 
and about 50 missiles. Its ballistic missile programme has the capacity to strike Japan, which 
is only eight and a half minutes flying time from launch in North Korea to impact at Japan’s 
closest territorial point. IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency) head Mohamed 
ElBaradei, speaking at the UN on 6 May 2005 said a North Korean nuclear test would have 
grave political and environmental consequences: stating “There will be disastrous political 
repercussions in Asia and the rest of the world. I think there could be major environmental 
fallout, which could lead into dissemination of radioactivity in the region.” Whether 
Pyongyang has such destructive power or not, the nuclear threat has created apprehension in 
Japan and has contributed more than any other factor to Japan’s growing concern over its 
national security. One of the reasons for Japanese unease is that even a low-level military 
attack would cause severe damage in Japan because of its high population density. Japanese 
leaders must treat the change in North Korean military capability seriously. In addition to the 
nuclear threat, the cloud of North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens remains; increasing 
Japanese uneasiness towards North Korea. As many as 80 Japanese citizens were abducted by 
North Korean agents from 1977 to 1983. Although the North Korean government admitted in 
late 2002 to having committed the abductions some 25 years earlier, it released the names of 
only 13 abductees. Only five abductees returned to Japan because, according to questionable 
evidence from North Korea, the others had died. Such antagonistic and arguably terroristic 
actions have greatly stimulated public vigilance and uneasiness in Japan towards North 
Korea. It is thus understandable that Japan wants to free itself from its current military 
limitations and increase its offensive military power. Japan feels too weak to respond to 
North Korea’s provocations and cannot prevent similar terrorist acts from occurring again. 
From the 1950 Korean War to the 2001 9/11 attack, a series of historical events coupled with 
American pressure have caused Japanese defence policy to undergo a gradual but significant 
transition: defence forces have developed from total disarmament to a strong and well-
equipped military; focus has shifted from simple territorial safety to comprehensive security 
including military, economic and environmental safety; and defence scope has stretched from 
immediate Japanese territory to neighbouring areas. Japan’s military strategy has gradually 
deviated from the earlier “ Exclusively Defence-Oriented Policy” to one much less passive in 
its scope. The perceived threats from China and North Korea, combined with the push from a 
swelling Japanese nationalism, will further accelerate the transition of Japan’s defence 
policy.46 
Japan’s misgivings, suspicions and apprehension concerning North Korea and its dangerously 
provocative and aggressive actions are not without valid foundation as the most recent 
artillery shelling of a South Korean Island by North Korea has so jarringly illustrated. World 
                                                            
46 Ke Wang, “Japan’s ‘Defense’ Policy: Strengthening Conventional Offensive Capability”, STANFORD JOURNAL 
OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS, 8, 1, (2008): 87, 94‐96. 
Japan Under The DPJ  Page 30 
 
leaders have condemned the Kim Jong-Il regime for the deaths and destruction inflicted on 
the population of Yeonpyeong and expressed concern over the possibility of further fearful 
clashes breaking out on the tension-plagued Korean Peninsula. Notwithstanding the shock 
Pyongyang’s action has generated, especially following the report by an American nuclear 
expert that North Korea has developed a sophisticated nuclear centrifuge capability at a 
previously unknown nuclear facility, the shelling by North Korea, although repugnant and 
alarming, is unlikely to lead to further hostilities on a major scale. Observers remark that this 
is simply the latest in a long line of such clashes and provocations by North Korea, including 
the controversial sinking of a South Korean warship attributed to Pyongyang. At critical 
times, including Kim’s designated succession as leader of his inexperienced youngest son (a 
move requiring the acquiescence of power-brokers in the North Korean Army) Kim Jong-Il 
can be expected to utilize the pretext of threats to North Korea’s security to advance his own 
objectives, rendering the people of Yeonpyeong Island pawns in the latest cynical act by the 
ailing North Korean dictator.47  
This latest act of North Korean aggression against the South has prompted a new round of 
public debate in China on how to manage ties with a neighbour that is at once a close ally but, 
increasingly, a source of international embarrassment. The Chinese government’s official 
response to North Korea’s shelling of a South Korean Island village remained cautious, 
stopping well short of criticism of the North. In comments reported on Thursday 25 
November 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao said China opposes “any provocative military 
behaviour” on the Korean Peninsula. However, it was not clear as to whether he was referring 
to North Korea’s attack, or to the South Korean military exercises North Korea claims to 
have caused the artillery shelling, or to the planned naval drills between the United States and 
South Korea. Premier Wen called the standoff between Seoul and Pyongyang a “severely 
complicated situation”, urged “all relevant parties to exercise the utmost restraint” and 
remarked that “the international community should do more work to ease the tension of the 
situation.” Nonetheless, among Chinese foreign-policy circles as well as general citizens, 
there are growing signs of exasperation with Pyongyang’s behaviour, causing some to 
question how Beijing benefits from its old communist ally’s provocations.48  
Japan’s response to the shelling was far less muted. On Friday 26 November 2010, Japan’s 
Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution against North Korea’s deadly shelling of the 
South Korean island, urging the Japanese government to consider fresh sanctions against 
Pyongyang. “The shelling was an outrageous act of violence,” the resolution said, 
maintaining further that “It was a provocative act that the international community cannot 
overlook.” The resolution said Prime Minister Kan’s government “should consider new 
sanctions and make more efforts to strengthen ties with countries concerned in order to step 
up international pressure on North Korea.” Tokyo has no diplomatic relations with 
Pyongyang and interactions between the two countries have long been tense because of the 
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communist state’s nuclear and missile programmes and past kidnappings of Japanese 
nationals. Some Japanese Ministers have already hinted that the Kan government would 
consider tougher sanctions against Pyongyang in the wake of the attack on the border island 
on Tuesday 23 November 2010.49 
Speculation has centred on the reasons why Kim’s secretive regime chose to launch the attack 
as and when it did. As noted earlier, commentators dismiss the possibility of the attack being 
the start of an escalating conflict that could drag regional powers into a catastrophic war. 
Rather, they place it in a context of calculated North Korean provocations designed to raise 
the geopolitical temperature but not to precipitate a major military engagement. Observers 
theorize as to North Korea’s motivations for the attack and have suggested five or so most 
likely explanations, including that it was all a misunderstanding (with South Korea’s armed 
forces conducting live firing drills in the vicinity of the afflicted island causing nervous North 
Korean officers to misinterpret the drills and believe that they were under attack); that it was 
another blackmail attempt (a hitherto successful strategy of bouts of bad behaviour by North 
Korea followed by promises to cease making ructions in return for concessions); that it was a 
sign of desperation (with Kim’s regime unable to cope with famine, malnutrition and misery 
affecting not only the civilian population but also the military, creating an urgent need for aid 
and prompting the artillery barrage as his way of demanding assistance); that it was the 
military making trouble (with hawkish and disgruntled elements in the military who are 
increasingly acting on their own initiative pursuant to their discontent with Kim Jong-Un’s 
planned succession as eventual regime leader); and that it was all or most of the above (with 
Kim Jong-Il launching the attack as a means of strengthening his hand in international affairs, 
of bolstering his domestic support and of gaining much-needed aid to boot.)50 
Japan’s policy toward North Korea is unlikely to be much different under the DPJ than it has 
been under the LDP. DPJ Foreign Minister Maehara will continue to insist that North Korea 
provide much more information about abducted Japanese citizens and will refuse to return to 
the Six Party Talks until his government is satisfied that it has obtained a full and proper 
accounting for these flagrant violations of Japan’s territorial sovereignty and the human rights 
of its citizens. 
The DPJ will further insist that North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons programme 
entirely, permanently dismantle all military nuclear facilities and allow international 
inspectors into that country to verify that such decommissioning has in fact fully occurred. 
The DPJ is also most likely to strongly support US pressure on North Korea to drop its 
demands for bilateral, as opposed to multilateral, negotiations and that North Korea cease all 
nuclear activity as  preconditions for the resumption of the Talks (which have been stalled 
now for two complete years.)  
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The DPJ will need to be convinced that North Korea is at last behaving with transparent 
authenticity and replete compliance with American, Russian, South Korean and Japanese 
stipulations. Only when such concurrence is forthcoming will the DPJ, like its LDP 
predecessors, agree to resume negotiations and to consider North Korean requests for aid and 
access to peaceful technology. The DPJ, like the LDP, will refuse to be held to ransom and 
will reject all attempts to obtain concessions through the application of nuclear blackmail or 
other forms of North Korean duress and coercion. 
CONCLUSION: 
In the aftermath of the DPJ’s overwhelming win in the Lower House Election of August 2009 
and during the subsequent events of the new government’s first 15 months of office, there has 
been much domestic and international commentary. Such discussion has revolved around the 
reasons for the defeat of the LDP after more than 50 years of almost continuous power, the 
ideological differences between the main parties, the likelihood of the emergence in Japan of 
a genuine two-party system offering voters a real choice between policies and programmes, 
the personalities of the leaders themselves, the effectiveness or otherwise of the new 
government and the outlook for Japan as it comes to grips with new political realities and 
pressing economic/diplomatic problems. 
One week after the 2009 Election, a British scholar, Sarah Hyde of the University of Kent, 
remarked that ideologically the LDP and the DPJ were not very different, with over-lapping 
ideas and several prominent DPJ members formerly being high-profile functionaries in the 
LDP (including Yukio Hatoyama and Ichiro Ozawa). Where the parties fundamentally 
differed was that while the LDP cared about factories, companies and rice farmers, the DPJ 
had more social awareness. The rise of the DPJ, in her view, was more about the unpopularity 
of the LDP than anything else. Much of the LDP’s unpopularity stemmed from rising 
unemployment, a sense of social deprivation and a belief that things were getting worse, not 
better. One problem for the DPJ, though, centred upon calls for looser military ties with 
America, including an end to the refuelling of American warships in the Indian Ocean. DPJ 
members run the gamut of those who want to send armed troops overseas and others who 
want to stop sending anything abroad ever again. Party luminaries like Ozawa have talked 
about Japan’s becoming a normal nation with more control over its security; whilst others 
like Hatoyama have talked about international roles within the constraints of Constitutional 
Article Nine involving non-military support in Afghanistan and anti-piracy work off the coast 
of Africa. Being a Stanford University graduate and not being “stupid”, Hatoyama, in Hyde’s 
opinion, was not likely to break up Japan’s relationship with America.51 
Writing in September 2010, a Japanese scholar, Hiroshi Kaihara of Meiji University, Tokyo, 
argued that the DPJ’s victory in 2009 is clearly an epoch-making event in Japanese political 
history. The LDP’s rule has ended: it is now an opposition party in both Lower and Upper 
Houses. According to a Yomiuri poll on 12 September 2009, 60% of the respondents 
favoured the change of government; whilst Britain’s BBC (as reported by Asahi on 31 August 
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2009) likened the DPJ’s victory to those of Blair and Obama. Kaihara noted what he regarded 
as some “disturbing” aspects in the Election, arguing that both the LDP and the DPJ avoided 
tough issues for voters to decide, competing instead to “pepper” them with promises of 
“pork-barrel” projects, which almost all observers wondered how to finance.52 
An Australian scholar, Purnendra Jain, of Adelaide University, writing also in September 
2010, offered a number of historical insights into the political philosophy, electoral strategies 
and commitment to ‘change’ politics of Naoto Kan, who in June 2010 became leader of the 
DPJ and Japan’s fifth Prime Minister in less than four years. Kan, he argued, has vowed to 
restore faith in a government plagued by broken campaign promises and funding scandals, 
after it ended over 50 years of mostly one-party rule nine months earlier. To Jain, Kan is 
manifestly a driven man. He was determined to succeed in political life although the son of 
an ordinary family. The political entrepreneurialism and pragmatism of his early campaign 
strategies appear to have stayed with him, as has his aversion to money politics and his 
concern for participatory democracy. ‘Citizens’, for him, are still a central issue. Now Prime 
Minister, Kan, in Jain’s view, will need all of the political “savvy” he has developed through 
30 years in Parliament. Kan has inherited a huge political responsibility across the nation’s 
economic, political and social spheres. He has already promised to be a fiscally focused 
reformer while at the national helm, and has declared as an important goal turning Japan into 
a country ‘genuinely’ governed by the wider public, not just a handful of officials in Tokyo.53 
With Naoto Kan, it seemed for a time that Japan’s political “merry-go-round” might stop. 
Upon being designated the new Prime Minister in June 2010, he won strong early support for 
his blunt warnings about Japan’s massive unsustainable debt and the need for tax increases to 
confront it. With this fresh, decisive and plain-spoken former activist, Japan also seemed to 
be terminating another questionable tradition: the de-facto hereditary control of high public 
office. Kan’s four predecessors were the sons or grandsons of former Prime Ministers, each 
quickly ‘flaming out’ and resigning in the face of falling approval ratings. In Japan, where 
more than a quarter of lawmakers are descendants of legislators, blood ties were almost a 
prerequisite for elevated political status. But Kan, the son of a salaryman with no special 
connections – as he liked to remind voters – seemed to spell the end to all that.54  
Just six weeks later, however, Kan made history for another, far less uplifting reason, the 
fastest fall from electoral grace in Japanese political precedent. In a stunning upset in July 
2010, Kan’s DPJ, in the Upper House Election, won just 44 seats, with the opposition LDP 
picking up 51 seats. Given such a direful showing, Kan now faces a very tough fight merely 
to remain in office. He must deal with a divided Parliament, without enough power in either 
House to push laws through, and has had to fend off a strong, though for the present, 
unsuccessful, leadership challenge from party ‘kingmaker’, wily tactician and formidable 
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power-broker, Ichiro Ozawa. LDP success has been attributed to public disenchantment with 
Kan and his party and the opposition can now bide its time, impeding legislation and 
embarrassing the floundering DPJ whenever it can.55  
From the outset of their (now troubled) period of office, DPJ leaders were not satisfied with 
simply taking power. They vowed to transform the political system itself. They would make 
Japan a true Parliamentary system in which the Prime Minister and the Cabinet would 
exercise authority over the bureaucracy and the ruling party – and not (as it had been for 
decades) the other way around. Yet, all too quickly, the DPJ’s political revolution has 
unravelled. The new leaders delivered, in the words of Steven Vogel of the University of 
California at Berkeley, “too much political change and too little policy improvement.” 56 
They made amateur missteps and they could not extract themselves from money politics. 
They might have weathered the 11 July 2010 Upper House Elections reasonably well were it 
not for one final blunder, when the new Prime Minister just weeks before voters went to the 
polls proclaimed his intention to raise (hated) consumption taxes. The DPJ remains in power 
after this electoral debacle because it maintains its majority in the more powerful Lower 
House. Yet now it will need help from other parties to enact ordinary legislation, which 
requires passage in both Houses. The two most likely partners, the New Komeito (a party 
affiliated with the Soka Gakkai, a Buddhist group) and Your Party (a new party led by LDP 
defectors with a pro-market outlook) have both flatly refused to form a coalition with the 
DPJ, leaving it stranded and forced to try to cobble together ad hoc, shifting and unreliable 
alliances to pass legislation. 57 
Many analysts felt that, after the 2009 Election, the real danger was not that the DPJ would 
falter, but rather, that the LDP would dissolve, leaving Japan once again with a single-party 
dominated political system. At that time, the surviving LDP leaders appeared battered, 
demoralized, listless and aimless – with several splinter groups breaking away and 
abandoning the party. Following the 2010 Upper House Election, the LDP has recovered with 
a respectable showing, causing it to re-emerge as a serious rival competing with the DPJ on 
substance as well as form. By focusing on politics over policy, and by alienating Japan’s 
highly-qualified and experienced officials (perhaps Japan’s true experts in policy formation 
and the policy process), the DPJ leaders generated a series of damaging and haunting policy 
failures in their first year of government – none of these being more glaring than the inability 
to formulate a coherent economic plan in the midst of a global economic crisis. 58 
The DPJ achieved a historic victory in 2009, one that will have a lasting impact on Japanese 
politics. Yet, since then, the party has delivered just what its election manifesto suggested it 
might: too much political overhaul and too little policy substance. If the DPJ leaders can learn 
from their mistakes, they may still be able to address Japan’s real needs for economic and 
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social reform before the next Lower House Election, due to be called some time before 
August 2013. It is not much time and the prospects for a reversal of low electoral standing are 
not stout, especially given the lack of a working Parliamentary majority. Nonetheless, the 
party leadership is determined to give effect to the promises it was elected to fulfil, and, if the 
buoyant current opposition overplays its hand, voters may once again turn to a government 
that they feel is close to their interests and devoid of the debased practices of the immediate 
past. 59 
What, then, can be said of the current political situation in Japan and its likely future 
direction? As has been noted earlier, present-day Japanese government and politics revolve 
around a “twisted Diet” – whereby the DPJ-led Coalition holds a majority in the House of 
Representatives whilst the LDP and other opposition parties hold a majority in the House of 
Councillors. Thus, whilst handsomely winning the Lower House Election of August 2009, 
the DPJ and its partners decidedly lost the Upper House Election of July 2010. In this 
manner, the DPJ-led Coalition won 44 seats in the Upper House Election (down from the 62 
seats it won in the 2007 Upper House Election); and the LDP-led Coalition won 61 seats (up 
from the 46 seats it won in 2007.) The DPJ Coalition thus lost 18 seats and the LDP Coalition 
gained 15 seats – a very significant turnaround in the 11 months since the Lower House 
Election the previous year. 
In terms of recent developments, the fortunes of the Kan government have been mixed. On 
Friday 27 November 2010, the Diet passed an extra budget worth 4.85 trillion yen (or US$58 
billion) to introduce a new stimulus package aimed at averting the threat of a “double-dip” 
recession. All was not plain sailing, however. The budget passed only because the Lower 
House, dominated by Prime Minister Kan’s ruling DPJ, overruled a vote in the opposition-
controlled Upper House, enabling the package to become law. The stimulus package, 
designed to ease concerns over deflation and a strong yen, included provision for job 
programmes, welfare spending and assistance schemes for small businesses and 
infrastructure. It was the second such stimulus initiated by the Kan administration since its 
accession to power.60 
Promising to cut spending and to reduce massive public debt of 200% of GDP, Kan’s 
ambitions have been complicated by the condition of Japan’s economy. Exports growth is 
slowing, crippling deflation persists and the government has downgraded its economic 
outlook for the first time since February 2009. The country has been stuck in a deflationary 
spiral since the asset bubble burst in the early 1990s and consumer spending has never fully 
recovered to become a major driver of growth. The country’s trade-reliant recovery is ebbing, 
potentially worsening corporate earnings thereby lowering household incomes and 
dampening consumer demand. Analysts downplayed the likely impact of the extra budget, 
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saying government expectations were overly optimistic and that the additional spending 
would be too little to be felt by voters.61 
The strong yen has made Japanese goods more expensive and eroded overseas profits; it has 
also made imports cheaper, prolonging the damaging deflationary cycle through consumers’ 
postponement of purchases in the hope of further price reductions, clouding future corporate 
investment. Although cutting official interest rates to almost zero and selling the surging yen 
in the foreign exchange market, such moves in Japan have not halted the rising value of its 
currency – thus sustaining economic difficulties.62 
The Kan government is facing an increasingly uncertain future after a bruising battle to enact 
its spending package, accompanied by a Parliamentary rebuke of two of its most senior 
advisors. Shortly after the vote to over-ride the Upper House’s defeat of the package, the 
Upper House proceeded to pass censure motions against Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito 
Sengoku and Land Minister Sumio Mabuchi. The principal criticisms of both men related to 
their handling of the aftermath of the collision between a Japanese patrol ship and a Chinese 
fishing boat in disputed waters in September 2010 – the divisive and humiliating Zhan 
incident referred to earlier in this discourse. Although Messrs Sengoku and Mabuchi are not 
obliged to step down from office over the censure motions, the actions represent the strong 
disapproval of the government both inside the Diet and outside amongst voters – government 
standing being around only 25% in opinion polls, below the threshold of 30%, the point at 
which past Cabinets have often perished. The enactment of the budget, though, is some rare 
good news, with one of the main priorities of the DPJ-led administration being to tackle the 
long-running economic predicaments it inherited from the now-opposition LDP. Such actions 
will become increasingly arduous, though, given LDP threats of refusing to work with the 
two censured officials and a tacit unwillingness to compromise in passing legislation. 
Political analysts surmise whether Naoto Kan will be forced from office less than a year after 
assuming the Premiership, mirroring the fate of his DPJ predecessor Yukio Hatoyama and the 
last three Prime Ministers under the previous LDP – Shinzo Abe, Yasuo Fukuda and Taro 
Aso.63 
For its part, the LDP celebrated the 55th anniversary of its founding on Monday 15 November 
2010, being bolstered somewhat by its victory in the House of Councillors Election in July, 
but still facing significant obstacles to regaining the power it lost to the DPJ in the previous 
Summer’s House of Representatives Election. To retrieve its standing as the ruling party, the 
LDP is aware that it must attain new support and shed its former practices of being a 
supporter primarily of large companies and sectional interest groups. It must also secure the 
backing of the New Komeito Party, its former Coalition partner, if it is to win the next Lower 
House Election. In vigorous attempts to win over still-sceptical voters – who remember LDP 
scandals over money politics, kept mistresses of conspicuous politicians, pork-barrel 
spending on massive public works projects tailored to benefit LDP corporate sponsors and 
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incompetence such as the losing of millions of social security records – Party President 
Sadakazu Tanigaki is touring all 47 of Japan’s Prefectures, talking to public meetings and 
stressing the assertion that the LDP is more competent than the DPJ and that the opposition 
party is ready to return to power. There is no guarantee, however, that the New Komeito, 
which holds the balance of power in the current divided Diet, will cooperate with the LDP’s 
plans. Although holding only 21 out of the 480 Lower House seats, the New Komeito holds a 
vital 19 of the 242 Upper House seats, giving it much influence over what legislation will be 
passed and what will be voted down.64 
The New Komeito Party stresses its commitment to three principal goals – decentralizing 
government authority; creating a socially engaged education system; and promoting nuclear 
abolition, peace and the environment worldwide. The Party’s Chief Representative, Natsuo 
Yamaguchi, castigates world value systems as having excessively prioritized the pursuit of 
profit over the advancement of human welfare, resulting in the distortion and undermining of 
proper values. He has stressed the need for humanity to embrace new perspectives and 
solutions before proceeding afresh. He posits the goal of Japan’s becoming a “major 
humanitarian power” as opposed to nations which define themselves as leading military or 
economic powers. Such an objective, in his view, requires a dramatic transformation of 
Japan’s own politicians through concentrating on accountability to grass-roots communities, 
locally-generated political actions and a policy emphasis based on a foremost consideration 
of people and their real-world needs. Such a policy outlook meshes to some degree with the 
increased welfare spending proposals of the DPJ, though, to date, the New Komeito has 
steadfastly refused any formal Coalition arrangement with the governing party. It may prefer 
to negotiate Parliamentary support for major proposals by both the DPJ and the LDP on a 
case-by-case basis and avoid being “locked into” decisions which clash with its novel 
humanitarian vision for Japan and its people.65 
Finally, it would appear that there are four inter-related future possibilities for the DPJ - 
including the formation of unstable and short-lived coalitions with smaller parties ( such as 
the now-failed alignment between the DPJ and the SDP which abruptly ended when the 
smaller party walked out of the government following the dismissal of its leader over her 
refusal to endorse the retention of American bases on Okinawa); compromise legislative 
arrangements with the LDP on a case-by-case basis (such as the agreement by the LDP to 
support unpopular measures involving the increase in the consumption tax to pay for 
government programmes and to ease the national debt burden); the calling of an early Lower 
House Election forced by policy and legislative gridlock with the Upper House (which, 
instead of strengthening the present government’s hand in guiding its legislation through 
Parliament, would probably reduce its numbers, tightening the grip of opposing parties on the 
control of law-making); or fragmentation of the DPJ itself into electorally-competing pro-
Ozawa and anti-Ozawa political groupings (a possible outcome given the almost even divide 
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amongst DPJ Diet-members of approximately 400 votes each for Kan and Ozawa in the 
September 2010 Party Presidential Elections, foreshadowing a potential power struggle 
engendering two distinct splinter parties and utterly shattering the unity of the Kan 
government.) 
Given these four possible outcomes for the DPJ, what then can be said of the most recent 
developments concerning the party’s troubled present and future circumstances? In terms of 
alliances with smaller parties, Prime Minister Kan has reaffirmed his alliance with his junior 
partner, the People’s New Party (PNP), thus maintaining the Coalition and intending to pass a 
postal reform Bill in January 2011. Social Democratic Party (SDP) Leader Mizuho 
Fukushima, however, said her party, which used to be part of the ruling Coalition, would 
oppose the FY 2011 budget if Kan’s Cabinet altered in principle Japan’s longstanding policy 
of not exporting weapons or arms technology. This decision could have serious repercussions 
for the beleaguered Kan government. Although holding a majority in the Lower House, the 
DPJ does not have the necessary two thirds majority to over-ride Bills rejected by the Upper 
House. If the SDP withheld support for the DPJ, Kan would be unable to constitutionally 
quash opposition to the budget from the Upper House and would be powerless to secure 
funds vital for the conduct of government business.66 Moreover, hopes have faded for the 
possible enlistment of support from the New Komeito Party, previously viewed as the most 
sympathetic to the DPJ and one which could have given it a much-needed majority in the 
Upper House. The party joined the opposition in voting down the government’s latest 
stimulatory spending plan, with New Komei Leader, Natsuo Yamaguchi, remarking “we 
really came to question the overall stance of the government.”67  
Internally as well, the DPJ is facing schism and division. Senior DPJ lawmakers such as Ms 
Makiko Tanaka are urging Prime Minister Kan to resign, amid damaging criticisms by the 
public of his handling of recent territorial disputes with China and Russia and plunging levels 
of approval ratings. “We are seeing the beginning of the end as it is painfully clear Parliament 
will come to a deadlock sooner rather than later,” Ms Tanaka said. “Rather than trying to buy 
time, he [Mr Kan] should step down.” Ms Tanaka, though, is loyal to power-broker Ichiro 
Ozawa, around whom in late November 2010 some 50 recently-elected lawmakers formed a 
new intra-party group, rekindling speculation that Ozawa might leave the party, taking many 
supporters and adherents with him and splitting the DPJ completely asunder.68 
In closing, what can be said of the Futenma US Marines Base issue, which brought down 
Naoto Kan’s predecessor, Yukio Hatoyama, and which threatens to do the same for Mr Kan? 
On Sunday 28 November 2010, Hirokazu Nakaima was re-elected as Governor of Okinawa, 
obtaining 335,708 votes to 297,082 votes for his opponent, Yoichi Iha, a winning margin of 
38,626 ballots or 13%. Nakaima made it clear during the gubernatorial election campaign that 
he wants the US Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station in Ginowan to be relocated outside 
Okinawa prefecture. “The bilateral agreement is quite regrettable. [Transferring the Base] 
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within the prefecture is difficult. Speaking practically, it’s impossible,” he said during the 
election campaign. The bilateral agreement stipulates the transfer of the Futenma Base 
functions to a replacement facility, to be constructed at Camp Schwab in the Henoko area of 
Nago and adjacent waters. Constructing the replacement facility in the Henoko district will 
require reclamation of land, for which the permission of the prefectural Governor is needed. 
Central government Transport Minister Sumio Mabuchi, who has responsibility for Okinawa 
prefecture, said after the election, “While closely communicating with the prefectural 
government, we’ll work on measures to realize self-reliance and suitable development of the 
prefectural economy.” No matter what occurs between the central and prefectural 
governments, however, it will be untenable for Nakaima to disregard the Nago municipal 
government and suddenly approve the transfer. The matter, then, remains as fractious as ever, 
with many Okinawans wanting an end to the stationing of US forces anywhere within their 
prefecture, and the central government in Tokyo bound to retain such forces in a slightly 
different location, though still within Okinawa. The impasse may cost Mr Kan the 
Premiership, given that his party may desert him and that the United States will insist on the 
implementation of the original agreement.69 
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